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Things change; that's the way it is in our world. For instance, man,
before he was man, relied heavily upon his sense of smell to detect
food, to notice danger, and to otherwise conduct the business of life.
The olfactory nerves were critical to our ancestors' survival. As time
passed the olfactory nerves developed; some of them evolved into the
brain. Man still smells; but, thanks to change we also think.'
Law, like living things, evolves. Focusing on the law now or the
present purpose or name of a particular doctrine may distract from
what law has or might become. Punitive damages in personal injury
cases may now be subject to that sort of intellectual myopia. The doctrine
has long been under attack. 2 Critics have argued that criminal law exists
to punish;3 they contend there is no acceptable modern logic for such
a "twisted" use of tort law. 4 The numbers of those voicing such concerns
has grown in recent years.' Courts and legislatures have also begun to
reexamine the recovery of punitive damages in personal injury cases.6
1. D. Ackerman, A Natural History of the Senses 20 (1990).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
3. See infra note 6. Of course a rational system might choose to use an administrative
scheme to punish certain wrongdoers or at least to ensure that their conduct does not
egregiously fall below certain standards. In some ways this is part of the purpose of such
organizations as the Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the Consumer Products Safety Commission. In actuality, these or-
ganizations and the administrative schemes they oversee work hand-in-hand with the
criminal law and the civil law of torts to punish and to deter wrongdoers. Much of the
modern regulation of safety in the United States is accomplished through a variety of
mechanisms. Occasionally one may wonder if the multiplicity of regulators, using the term
in its broadest sense (although recently courts in cigarette preemption cases have recognized
state tort law as "regulation," see, e.g., Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420
(5th Cir. 1989)) does not lead to either under- or over-deterrence and uncertainty (for an
economic analysis of the effect of uncertainty on the law of torts, see Grady, A New
Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 Yale L.J. 799 (1983)). Whatever conclusion
one may draw, it is apparent that a society in choosing a "regulatory" scheme has a
broad range of choice regarding what devices to use and how to use them. See, e.g., G.
Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 18-20 (1970).
4. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 103-04 (1982)
[hereinafter Owen, Civil Punishment]; Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Com-
mon Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 134-43 (1982).
5. See generally Ingram, Punitive Damages Should be Abolished, 17 Cap. U.L. Rev.
205 (1988); Sales and Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins,
37 Vand. L. Rev. 1117 (1984).
6. Recently the "quasi-criminal" or penal nature of punitive damages attracted the
attention of the United States Supreme Court. In Browning-Ferris Indust. of Vermont,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989), the Court, in a seven to two vote,
held that the eighth amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and penalties does
not apply to the award of punitive damages in a case between two private parties.
Browning-Ferris involved anti-trust and intentional interference with contract claims
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As this reexamination continues, it would be remiss to ignore the
fact that there may well be another role for punitive damages, or a
which one waste disposal company brought against another. The defendant Browning-
Ferris had entered the Burlington, Vermont market for waste disposal in 1976. One of
the services that it provided was roll-off waste collection.. Until 1980, it was the only
firm in the area engaged in roll-off waste collection. In that year, a former employee,
Kelley, opened a competing firm, Kelco Disposal, Inc. A bitter struggle for the market
ensued from which Kelco ultimately emerged the victor. At one point in the battle for
market, Kelco's revenues dropped 30% and after the war was over Kelco sued Browning-
Ferris, alleging that it violated section 2 of the Sherman Act and that under Vermont
tort law Browning-Ferris had intentionally interfered with Kelco's contracts (actually both
Kelley and Kelco sued but their claims were severed and the case that went up to the
Supreme Court was Kelco's claim). A jury returned a verdict in Kelco's favor on both
the state and federal claims, awarding plaintiff $51,146 in compensatory damages and
$6,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial judge awarded Kelco either $153,438 in treble
damages and $212,500 in attorneys' fees under the anti-trust claim or $6,066,082.74 on
the state law claim. Not surprisingly, Kelco chose the latter. The, court affirmed. The
Court found the question of the due process challenge of a jury award of $6,000,000 on
a damage award of $51,146 was not properly before the Court because the "petitioners
failed to raise their due process argument before [the lower courts] and made no specific
mention of it in their petition of certiorari. . . ." The Court did say in dicta "[there is
some authority ... for the view that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the
size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme .... " Id. at 2909.
By way of background, the year before the Browning-Ferris case, defendants in a case
that arose in Mississippi had alleged that a jury verdict of $1,600,000 in punitive damages
in a bad faith insurance case offended the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment,
the due process clause, and the contract clause; however, the court did not decide those
issues because, as Justice Marshall wrote for the majority, the defendants had failed to
adequately raise those issues. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71,
108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988). Thus, the Court would not review the punitive damages award
on the grounds that it either had no jurisdiction to do so or because assuming that the
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule was prudential, it would exercise its discretion
not to review the award. The Court did decide that a 150 penalty that unsuccessful
appellants must pay in Mississippi in cases involving money judgments and other judgments
that are easily valued did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Justice O'Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. 486 U.S.
at 86, 108 S. Ct. at 1654 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). She pointed out that although the Court could have asserted jurisdiction over
the punitive damages due process issue, it was prudent not to do so. Justices White and
Scalia held that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the constitutional attacks on the
punitive damages award. 484 U.S. at 85, 108 S. Ct. at 1654 (White, J., concurring) and
486 U.S. at 89, 108 S. Ct. at 1656 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
In Browning-Ferris, Justice Brennan concurred with Justice Marshall joining. 109 S.
Ct. 2923 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan merely emphasized that the
Court's decision did not preclude a later finding that an award of punitive damages might
offend the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Justice O'Connor dissented in part
and concurred in part with Justice Stevens joining. Justice O'Connor contended that the-
historical concerns that precipitated the inclusion of the eighth amendment in the United
States Constitution were implicated by punitive damages awards in suits between private
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descendent thereof, to perform a deterrence function. Deterrence is not
parties. As a result, she would have remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to apply
the proportionality test used in cruel and unusual punishment cases and set forth in Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S, Ct. 3001 (1983), to determine if the $6,000,000 which the
jury in the Browning-Ferris case had awarded as punitives was excessive.
Interestingly, in January 1989, a federal district court judge in Montana denied a request
by various manufacturers and distributors of asbestos to bar further punitive damages
against them on the ground that they had been punished enough. In Campbell v. ACandS,
Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Mont. 1989), the court rejected defendants' claim that further
awards of punitive damages would serve no deterrent effect because the conduct which
plaintiff claimed caused liability could not be repeated under current governmental re-
gulations. The court decided that the goal of deterrence extends beyond the particular
defendants before the court engaging in the exact same conduct to the public in general.
The court also expressed a hesitancy to take the damage question from the jury and held
that Montana law, which allows the imposition of punitive damages if the "defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, malice, or where the defendant has acted so recklessly
as to indicate wanton disregard of another's rights" was not unconstitutionally void for
vagueness. Campbell, 704 F. Supp. at 1024.
Later that year, but before the decision in Browning-Ferris, a federal district court
judge in New Jersey, Judge Sarokin, held that in a mass tort case involving asbestos
manufacturers the potential for multiple awards of punitive damages for the same conduct
was offensive to the due process guarantees contained in the fifth amendment. Juzwin
v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, decision vacated on reconsideration, 718
F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989). In his conclusion, Judge Sarokin stated, in part:
The court concludes that a manufacturer or other mass tortfeasor cannot be
subjected to repeated punitive damage awards for the same conduct. In the
absence of a class action which binds all claimants, resolution of such claims
requires legislation.
Due process requires that a limit be placed upon a defendant's liability for
punitive damages for a single course of conduct. If a defendant's conduct has
been evaluated by a factfinder, and if that factfinder has made an assessment
of the amount of punitive damages necessary to deter and punish that conduct,
then this court concludes that any further punishment would be unnecessary,
repetitive, and a violation of due process. Thus, with respect to those defendants
who are able to present competent proof that liability for punitive damages has
already been imposed upon them for the conduct alleged to be the basis of a
punitive damage claim in this action, the court will dismiss plaintiff's claim for
such punitive damages.
Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1065.
The court also held that the potential imposition of punitive damages did not trigger
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1057-59,
and that even if the eighth amendment might be implicated in punitive damages cases in
general it was not in the present case because the excessive fines clause would require a
"factual finding that previous awards of punitive damages have been imposed upon an
individual defendant and a finding that any further monetary award would cross the line,
wherever it may lie, between acceptable awards and 'excessive' ones." Juzwin, 705 F.
Supp. at 1060. As Judge Sarokin noted, in the case before him he was not concerned
with the right to reduce or set aside an award of punitive damages in a particular case
but "the situation where a defendant is threatened with successive awards of punitive
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used here in the classic sense of deterrence through punishment. 7 In the
damages for the same course of conduct, wherein any single award might be appropriate
with regard to the conduct of defendant, but where the aggregate of such awards becomes
or has the potential to become excessive." Juzwin, 705 F. Supp. at 1060.
Then, on July 5, 1989, a different federal judge sitting in New Jersey, Judge Fisher,
specifically and categorically rejected Judge Sarokin's holding. Leonen v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.J. 1989). Judge Fisher found no legal or equitable support
for the Juzwin proposition that. the first (successful?) plaintiff to recover punitives in a
mass tort case precluded all subsequent plaintiffs from recovering. He suggested that the
court in Juzwin ignored the salutary effect that punitive damages awards can have in
protecting consumer safety by encouraging manufacturers to make safer products. He
noted that the Juzwin decision assumed that the first jury to award punitive damages
would consider the overall harm that the defendant caused and that the first award would
be adequate punishment for the defendant. Judge Fisher considered this to be an unrealistic
assumption, especially in New Jersey where punitive damages must bear a reasonable
relation to compensatories. In response to the defendant's argument that repetitive punitive
awards jeopardized future plaintiffs' compensatory damage recoveries, Judge Fisher noted
that theoretical possibility, but pointed out that none of the defendants before the court
had made a showing that those fears were more real than speculative. Leonen, 717 F.
Supp. at 284.
Subsequently, Judge Sarokin reversed himself, not because he thought he was wrong,
but because of the potential unfairness of his decision if other courts did not follow it.
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1223, 1234-35 (D.N.J. 1989). Now, the
United States Supreme Court is considering a due process challenge to a punitive damages
award in a civil case. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990).
7. When talking of deterrence in the context of punitive damages, courts most
frequently are referring to this quasi-criminal notion of deterrence-the severity of the
sting theory. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1203 (House of Lords)
(opinion of Lord Devlin).
The notion of quasi-criminal deterrence is evident in the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
opinion in United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989). In that case, the defendant
had already been sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined $5,000 for defrauding
Medicare. Subsequently, the U.S. Government brought a civil suit against him under the
Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1982), which allows the government to
recover the amount of the loss plus a civil sanction of $2,000 per violation. Mr. Halper
had defrauded Medicare 65 times, which meant that under the statute he could be subjected
to $130,000 in fines. The issue before the Court was whether the fine would expose
Halper to multiple punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause. In holding that
it would, the Court indicated that the key question was whether the fine was remedial
or punitive. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated:
To that end, the determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes pun-
ishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty
imposed and the purpose that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply
put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment.
These goals are familiar. We have recognized in other contexts that punishment
serves the twin alms of retribution and deterrence. [Citation omitted.] Further-
more "[rietribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objectives." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n. 20 (1979). From these premises,
it follows that a civil sanction that cannot be said solely to serve a remedial
1990]
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last thirty years or so, scholars, such as Yale's Guido Calabresi,8 have
employed the word deterrence in a related, but slightly different sense, 9
contending that inefficient behavior can be deterred by forcing actors
to accurately take account of all the costs of their activities. 10
purpose, but rather can be explained only as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.
Halper, id. at 1902.
It seems apparent that in this discussion Justice Blackmun is speaking of deterrence in
the classic sense that first year law students are exposed to in criminal law-if society
punishes "hard enough" people may think twice before repeating or engaging in proscribed
conduct. It seems that he is not speaking of deterrence in the sense that Dean Calabresi
and Judge Posner use the term. For as they and others have noted, see infra notes and
text accompanying notes 10, 11, 15 and 43-70, every award of compensatory damages
has a deterrent effect in terms of allocating costs of an activity to the defendant. In
contrast to Justice Blackmun's notion of deterrence, Professor Schwartz has stated: "[T]o
the extent that punitive damages are designed to deter, economic issues move emphatically
into the forefront. If punitive damages do indeed deter, it is due to the economic principle
that adding to the cost of an activity necessarily decreases its frequency." Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 135.
In contrast to the notion that compensatory as well as punitive damages can and do
have a deterrent effect, Clarence Morris noted all tort judgments based on the defendant's
fault are punitive in a sense that faultless persons do not generally have to pay com-
pensatory damages. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173,
1174 (1931).
8. G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 68-75.
9. It may be more accurate to say that the legal economist uses the term in essentially
the same fashion but merely views the entire problem of deterrence as a question of risk
allocation. Thus, to the legal economist, a criminal sanction is merely the cost of engaging
in certain proscribed activity. See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 5-6 (2d
ed. 1977).
10. At least since the 1961 publication of an article in the Yale Law Review by
Guido Calabresi, wherein the author ruminated on the legal and economic issues that risk
distribution suggested, deterrence has had an added meaning. Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961). In a footnote,
Calabresi, in passing, credits some earlier writers for at least raising the significance of
what he calls the "allocation of resources" justification. Id. at 501 n.12. In "The Costs
of Accidents," G. Calabresi, supra note 3, Calabresi refers to this added meaning as
"general deterrence." Id. at 27. General deterrence is an approach to tort regulation
which:
[I]nvolves ... letting the market determine the degree to which, and the ways
in which, activities are desired given such costs. Similarly, it involves giving
people freedom to choose whether they would rather engage in the activity and
pay the costs of doing so, including accident costs, or, given the accident costs
of doing so, including accident costs, engage in safer activities that might
otherwise have seemed less desirable. I call this approach general, or market,
deterrence .... General deterrence implies that accident costs would be treated
as one of the many costs we face whenever we do anything. Since we cannot
have everything we want, individually or as a society, whenever we choose one
thing we give up others. General deterrence attempts to force individuals to
A UGMENTED A WARDS
An award in excess of compensatory damages may efficiently deter
wherever compensatories, coupled with whatever other criminal or civil
fines are applicable, understate the costs the relevant activity imposes
consider accident costs in choosing among activities.
Id. at 69. As Calabresi points out, the theoretical underpinnings of his notion of general
deterrence is simply "the old one of allocation of resources which for years has been
studied in the branch of economics called welfare economics;' the free market solution is
the one traditionally given by welfare economists." Id. Theoretically, one will be deterred
from engaging in an activity which costs the actor more than it benefits him. Put somewhat
more technically (at least as technically as I dare to put it), the actor's marginal costs
for the activity will be greater than her marginal benefits. See infra text accompanying
notes 43-i0. As Calabresi notes, general deterrence operates in two ways to reduce the
costs of accidents. First, by forcing people to consider all the costs of their activities, it
encourages them to engage in safer activities. And, secondly, it encourages them to more
safely engage in the activities they do undertake. G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 73. A
basic prerequisite to the successful operation of Calabresi's general deterrence theory is
that actors accurately take account of all the relevant costs of theii activities. He states:
Failure to include accident costs in the prices of activities will, according to the
theory, cause people to choose more accident-prone activities than they would
if the prices of these activities made them pay for these accident costs, resulting
in more accidents than we want. Forbidding accident-prone activities despite the
fact that they can "pay" their costs would, in theory, bring about an equally
bad result from the allocation point of view.
Id. at 70. Judge Posner also has written extensively on the law and efficient behavior.
See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 9. In characterizing two views of the law of remedies,
Professor Laycock has written:
One might say that the substantive law forbids the cutting of other people's
trees, and that the usual remedy for a violation is a money judgment for the
value of the trees. Or one might say that the law forbids nothing; it merely
specifies the consequences of various choices. Thus the law says that if Smith
cuts Brown's trees, he will suffer a money judgment for their value; Smith has
a free choice.
Laycock, Modern American Remedies 7 (1985). The second view of remedies is Laycock's
description of the law and economics view of remedies, which he proceeds to critique.
Id. at 7-8. Obviously for the remedy (and the law) to be efficient, the costs that society
forces the actor to pay must accurately reflect all the societal costs of the activity (that
the actor has not already taken account of in some other part of his or her costing
calculus).
If the law only requires the actor to pay compensatory damages as the damage component
of accident costs, then persons who cause or may cause accidents will act efficiently (in
terms of the activities in which they engage and the manner in which they engage in
them) only if compensatory damages accurately measure the costs of their accidents,
excluding accident avoidance costs. Total accident costs include not only the damages that
a person's conduct imposes upon others (and society) but also accident avoidance costs
that the actor incurs. As Clarence Morris noted, in "a case in which it is desirable to
repair a plaintiff's loss and to condemn a defendant's conduct, there is still difficulty of
accomplishing these two very different ends with one money judgment. The sum required
to make the plaintiff whole may be much too severe or much too lenient as admonition
for the defendant." Morris, supra note 7, at 1175.
A short description of Dean Calabresi's theory of general deterrence and Clarence
1990]
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upon society. In the vernacular of the economist, an increased, or
augmented, award in such a case may operate to remove an "exter-
nality." It would do so by forcing the actor to accurately take account
of all the costs of his activity. Such an augmented award would be
efficient whenever the increased deterrence from the award outweighed
the cost of obtaining that deterrence."
In many types of tort cases legal rules prohibit the recovery of real
losses because the administrative costs of awarding those losses is too
high. As such, there are two problems. First, people are not compen-
sated-a sad fact which is beyond the scope of this paper. Second,
actors need not consider those losses in their cost calculations. An
augmented award reflecting these otherwise unrecoverable losses to some-
one whom the law does allow to recover from the actor society wishes
to deter might cause a deterrence gain without an undue administrative
drain. One representative legal rule discussed below 12 is the rule that
prohibits the recovery of negligently inflicted economic losses absent
personal injury or property damage; but which allows recovery of ec-
onomic losses if the plaintiff suffered some accompanying damage to
person or property. Assuming this rule is driven by administrative con-
cerns, 3 an augmented award to those whom we currently allow to recover
may more efficiently deter without unduly increasing administrative costs
which direct compensation would do.
Thus, the augmented award is related to, but different from, punitive
damages as we know them. The sole purpose of the augmented award
is deterrence. Augmented awards would not be designed to punish the
defendant for otherwise evil behavior; they would be designed to en-
courage actors to consider the costs of their action, costs for which our
current legal rules do not account. They would be tailored to deal with
situations where decision makers cannot easily adjust current legal dogma
to directly compensate those injured, most often because of the high
administrative costs associated with a "direct" fix. As such, augmented
Morris' legal realist comment on the clumsiness of compensatory damages in tort cases,
suggests a role that punitive, or exemplary, damages might play in deterring inefficiently
high levels of accident causing behavior and inefficiently low investments in accident
avoidance. In the article from which the Morris quotation comes, the author repeatedly
refers to that favorite of the Realists, the law in action. See id. at 1182, 1189-90, 1206,
and 1208-09.
11. This is certainly not to suggest that there may not be instances where compensatory
damages may be too high and overdeter people from engaging in what would be efficient
conduct. The operation of the classic "thin skull rule," see Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 103
A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), might fit into this category as
might the direct but not foreseeable consequences doctrine exemplified most dramatically
in In re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., [1921] K.B. 560.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 169-209.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 188-96.
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awards would ideally equal total accident costs less compensatories plus
the "value" of other applicable fines or penalties.
I have chosen to call such damages augmented awards rather than
punitive damages for several reasons. First, the adjective punitive focuses
on punishment, not deterrence. Even the pseudonym "exemplary" dam-
ages highlights classic deterrence concerns, not efficiency. Second, a new
name hopefully avoids the problem of guilt by association. Finally, I
do not mean to imply that the possibility of augmented awards in certain
cases signals the total demise of punitive damages. In some cases pun-
ishment may still be appropriate apart from efficiency concerns. 4 This
paper, however, is about augmented awards, awards in excess of com-
pensation which are intended to encourage efficient investments in safety,
awarded in the cases where such awards may be appropriate. I do not
mean to imply that law, from a normative standpoint, should only
concern itself with efficiency. However, if one accepts the notion that
the law might play a role in the deterrence of "inefficient" accident-
causing behavior by forcing actors to take into account all the costs of
the accidents that they may cause, a place might exist for something
similar to what we now call punitive damages. 5 Courts and legislatures
all over the country examining the place of punitive damages in twenty-
first century tort law ought to consider the possibility that in some areas
of the law compensatory damages do not operate as an adequate de-
terrent. In such cases, some other device, such as augmented awards is
needed to efficiently lower the number and severity of accidents.
The following sections further examine the theoretical underpinnings
of the case for augmented awards and describe some of the factors that
might cause unduly low compensatory damages in relation to total
accident costs. Section II generally discusses how America regulates
accidents, the theoretical ways in which tort law can deter inefficient
accident-causing behavior, and how insurance operates in practice and
theory. Section III sets forth the general rules relating to the recover-
ability of punitive damages and how scholars have analyzed punitives
from an efficiency oriented perspective. Section IV analyzes the aug-
mented awardls proposal, identifying appropriate cases for recovery of
augmented awards and examining a representative case study-the ec-
onomic harm rule. Section V examines the augmented awards proposal
in light of the traditional law of punitive damages. Section VI briefly
identifies and discusses some of the practical issues this piece's proposal
raises. Section VII discusses augmented awards in light of recent punitive
14. After all, we do still smell. See supra text companying note 1.
15. For a related treatment of punitive damages in contract cases, see Sebert, Punitive
and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the
Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1565 (1986).
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damages reform and Section VIII describes several studies of punitive
damages in actions which seem to indicate that extra compensatory
awards are not the problem tort reformers would have us believe.
II. GENERAL CONCEPTS
A. American Accident "Regulation"
The American criminal justice system penalizes those who engage
in certain activities which are likely to lead to accidents.1 6 Additionally,
one's conduct might expose him to a civil fine. Likewise, we have a
system of tort law that forces people who cause accidents, under certain
circumstances, to pay certain accident victims certain damages. The body
of substantive tort rules determines when and who the actor must pay.
The law of damages provides what damages the accident causing actor
must pay, if liable. 7
Substantively, American courts have developed batches of rules to
limit the liability of defendants in various circumstances. For instance,
many courts hold that economic damages, such as lost profits, are not
recoverable in tort in the absence of some physical injury. 8 More gen-
erally, in order to recover at all in tort, there must be a legally sufficient
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 9 If this relationship
exists then, more often than not, the court summarily concludes that
the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty.20 Conversely, if the relationship
16. According to Calabresi, the prohibition of an activity would be a specific deterrence
approach to accident regulation. G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 94. Of course, the drawback
of specific deterrence is that it is a collectively imposed decision and does not allow actors
the freedom to choose for themselves that the market does. The less confident a society
is that certain behavior is bad or inefficient, the less likely it would seem that society
would opt for a specific deterrence scheme of regulation for that activity.
17. Actually, this statement draws boundaries that are not quite so clear in practice.
There are many questions that fit well as either torts or damages issues. One well worn
example is the recovery of damages for mental distress. One could, of course, argue that
the entitlement to a certain type of damages is a question of substantive tort law, whereas
the measure of those damages is a remedies question; but that would be a somewhat
artificial way to resolve what is essentially a boundary dispute between torts and remedies
teachers.
18. D. Laycock, supra note 10, at 157 (Supp. 1987); see also State of La. ex rel.
Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
903, 106 S. Ct. 3271 (1986).
19. See generally W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 42, at 274-75 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.) [hereinafter Prosser and
Keeton].
20. Pitre v. Opelousas General Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (La. 1988) ("Terms
such as 'duty' are merely verbal expressions of policy decisions and do not explain them.");
Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 53, at 359 ("No better general statement can be
made than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would
recognize it and agree that it exists.").
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does not exist the court concludes that the defendant does not owe the
plaintiff a duty. 21 Most distressingly for the first year law student, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries to recover in tort. All of these limitations on
liability are rooted in policy. 22 Some are designed to reduce administrative
burdens on courts23 and to avoid overdeterring socially beneficial activ-
ities.24
As to who may recover if the elements of a tort are established,
the physically injured victim is obviously entitled. In addition, in many
states certain designated close relatives can recover for the losses they
suffer as a result of a victim's death.25 Wrongful death claimants gen-
erally -recover for losses that they suffer as a result of the death of a
loved one26 and survival action plaintiffs essentially bring suit to recover
the decedent's damages. 27 Typically included beneficiaries are spouses,
children, parents, siblings, and, in a survival action, the decedent's
estate. 2 But often, if there is a spouse or children, parents or siblings
are not entitled to recover.29 If there is no spouse or children, parents
will recover to the exclusion of siblings.30 Additionally, in many states,
close relatives can recover for loss of consortium when a family member
is hurt but not killed.3 If plaintiff winds her way through these rules
and establishes liability, she will recover compensatory damages.
Based in corrective justice,32 compensatory damages in personal in-
jury cases return the plaintiff to the position she would have been in
21. Perhaps the classic example of this relational requirement was the once universal
rule that privity of contract was required to sue the seller or manufacturer of a dangerous
product in tort.
22. As Dean Leon Green said in particular reference to the duty problem in torts:
"Hence, my suggestion is that law, wherever found, is in turn controlled by factors largely
common to all sorts of administration, whether of formal government or other forms of
group activity." L. Green, Judge and Jury 76 (1930); see also Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60 (1956).
23. L. Green, supra note 22, at 76.
24. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 41, at 264.
25. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, ch. 23.
26. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 8.3, at 556 (1973).
27. W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Torts 553-54 (5th
ed. 1984).
28. See generally Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, ch. 12. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code
arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2. S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, Appendix A (2d ed.
1975 and Supp. 1989).
29. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2315; see also Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v.
Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986) (adult-child victim relationship);
Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa
1983) (child-adult victim relationship).
32. G. Field, A Treatise on the Law of Damages §§ 3, 6 (1876); A. Greenleaf, 2
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had the accident not occurred.3 One immediately notes there is a phil-
osophically pleasant ring to positing the purpose of damages in reparative
terms.14 If a defendant does something "bad" 35 the plaintiff recovers
the value of the amount of harm that the defendant caused her. From
the defendant's perspective, he is free to do whatever he wants unless
his conduct triggers liabilitys6 in which case he has an obligation to
compensate the plaintiff. Most jurisdictions allow an accident victim to
recover, as compensation, the value of any property damaged or de-
stroyed, lost wages, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and damages
for mental distress.37 There are numerous ancillary rules that seem to
conflict with this compensation goal, such as the collateral source rule3"
Greenleaf on Evidence §§ 253-56 (1892); F. Harper and F. James, 2 The Law of Torts
§ 25.1 (1974); T. Sedgwick, Treatise on the Measure of the Law of Damages, at 12
(1868).
33. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 1.1, at 1; D. Laycock, supra note 10, at 14-17
(Professor Laycock aptly and succinctly refers to the position that the plaintiff would
have been in but for the wrong as the "plaintiff's rightful position.").
34. Cf. infra text accompanying note 110.
35. "Bad" in Learned Hand's terms equates with failing to incur accident avoidance
costs where they are lower than the ex ante costs of an expected accident, though a
moralist might not call such conduct "bad." See infra text accompanying notes 155-61.
Of course, there is a moral tinge involved in our tort system as, well, see generally Prosser
and Keeton, supra note 19, § 4. Note that some commentators have questioned whether
courts actually do employ the Learned Hand definition of negligence. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521, 1538 n.95 (1987).
36. Most frequently the American tort system calls this basis for liability "fault."
Even where liability is ostensibly not based upon fault as in strict products liability, the
plaintiff still must show that a product was defective. Many courts define defective as
unreasonably dangerous to normal use. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269
Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964).
Even where the common law imposes strict, or absolute liability, outside the product
liability sphere, the plaintiff must show that the activity involved is ultrahazardous, or,
in other jurisdictions, abnormally dangerous, Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519, 520
(1976). As every first year torts student knows, courts have narrowly defined those activities
that they call ultrahazardous or unreasonably dangerous.
To summarize, fault is the prevalent criteria for determining liability in tort, even in
areas where there is supposedly liability without fault, definitions are frequently phrased
in terms that borrow from the fault lexicon.
37. See, e.g., D. Dobbs, supra note 26, ch. 8; D. Laycock, supra note 10, at 10-
211.
38. The collateral source rule provides that a plaintiff may recover damages repre-
senting sums for-which it has already been compensated from some other wholly inde-
pendent source. See, e.g., Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. App. 3d
1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970). The paradigmatic example is the recovery of
medical expenses from a tortfeasor despite the fact that the plaintiff has health insurance
that has already paid all his or her medical expenses. Perhaps because of its anomalous
appearance in a system supposedly geared toward compensation, the collateral source rule
has been attacked by tort reformers and a number of states have ,eliminated it or limited
its effect. See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, at 27 n.29 (Supp. 1988).
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and awards of punitive damages when the actor's conduct is willful,
wanton, intentional, reckless, or otherwise "evil" looking,3 9 and resti-
tution in certain tort cases.4 Likewise, in our world most actors com-
monly acquire insurance to protect them against liability for personal
injuries arising from accidents . 4  Insurance plays an important role in
assuring accident victims are compensated and in spreading the cost of
compensation across a broader spectrum of people than the victim and
the tortfeasor. 42
B. Efficiency and Accidents
1. Deterrence
Whatever deterrent effect tort law has is based partially on the way
it forces actors to take accident costs into account before deciding
whether, how, and when to act a. 4 Tort law relies heavily upon damages
to serve this deterrent function; thus, courts should try to assure that
the damages they award accurately measure all the costs that the de-
fendant's activity imposes upon society. If damages do not adequately
take account of all these costs tort law will underdeter." Underdeterrence
will lead to an overinvestment in the activity.43 Concomitantly someone
else must either bear, or avoid, accident costs that the actor does not
take into account." As such, a careful evaluation of compensatory
damages versus actual accident costs is appropriate in any evaluation
of the tort system. It is especially appropriate as America continues to
address what is popularly called a tort or insurance "crisis."
2. Efficiency
From an efficiency standpoint, an actor, when deciding upon a
course of conduct, should consider accurately all the potential costs of
39. See infra text accompanying notes 118-19 and infra text accompanying notes 263-
72.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 87-92.
41. The statement in text is a reference to third party insurance which protects the
insured from liability to another. Of course, people also obtain first party insurance to
protect them from the economic displacement of accidents (or disease). Examples include:
health insurance, life insurance, and disability insurance.
42. Risk spreading is by nature one of the essential purposes of liability insurance.
Priest, supra note 35, at 1543.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 47-51. This assumes no relevant criminal or
civil fines are applicable.
45. Id.
46. Of course, if that other person or entity is in an economically better position to
avoid or bear those accident costs, it would seem that efficiency taken alone would demand.
that they do so. See generally Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability
in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055 (1972).
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his proposed activity 7. 4  Otherwise the actor may either over or under
invest in that activity.48 One of the cost items the actor must take into
account is accident costs. 49 If accident costs are excluded from the actor's
calculations his perceived marginal cost curve for that activity will not
accurately reflect the true costs of the activity, and he will engage in
the activity more often than he should.50 Likewise, the lower cost of
the activity will make it attractive to others who will divert resources
from pursuits with a higher utility.5
A cost an actor does not otherwise have to take into account in
deciding what to do and how to do it is an externality. 2 Under certain
circumstances, the presence of externalities can impede the efficient
operation of markets. 3 'In the personal injury context, accident costs
47. See, e.g., G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 70.
48. Id. As Calabresi puts it:
Failure to include accident costs in the prices of activities will, according to the
theory, cause people to choose more accident-prone activities than they would
if the prices of these activities made them pay for these accident costs, resulting
in more accident costs than we want. Forbidding accident-prone activities despite
the fact that they can 'pay' for their costs would, in theory, bring about an
equally bad result from a resource allocation point of view. Either way the
postulate that individuals know best for themselves would be violated.
49. This is in essence the message of much of the work of the law and economics
scholars who write on torts. See, e.g., G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 70.
50. See, e.g., Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1281, 1289 (1980)
The entity bearing the costs of accidents will have an incentive to keep spending
to reduce those costs up to the point at which marginal costs of accident
avoidance equals marginal cost of accidents .... Failure to internalize all accident
costs, then, amounts to a subsidy for high accident cost goods and services,
and an indirect subsidy for accidents.
51. For instance, if the actual cost, including accident costs, of driving in the wrong
lane was $10 per drive, but, because drivers who drove in the wrong lane were not
charged for all their accident costs, the apparent cost was $7, people who would not
drive in the wrong lane if they had to pay $10 may drive in the wrong lane if the cost
to them was only $7. Moreover, if the cost of reading Don Quixote was $8, many people
who would otherwise read Don Quixote if the cost for driving in the wrong lane were
$10 would decide to drive in the wrong lane rather than read because the cost of driving
in the wrong lane is lower than it should be. However, these people would be better off
reading Don Quixote if they had to take all the costs of driving in the wrong lane into
account.
52. R. Posner, supra note 9, at 51-52. J. Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications
449-54 (1976).
53. J. Hirshleifer, supra note 52, at 449. "Direct externalities, beneficial or harmful,
lead the Invisible Hand astray. In the interests of efficiency, the agent generating the
externality ought, if the externality is beneficial, to be induced to engage in the process
even more than his private self-interest would dictate. If the externality is harmful, of
course, the generating agent ought to be induced to diminish the scale of [the activity]
in comparison with what his self-interest would dictate." In the case of an efficiency
justification for augmented awards the concern is with harmful externalities.
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the actor need not count as a cost of his injury causing activity are
externalities which may unduly impede the efficient reduction and avoid-
ance of certain accidents."
a. Accident Costs
As a logical prerequisite to determining if actors are taking account
of all accident costs, it is necessary to define accident costs." One very
real component of accident costs is the amount people expend on accident
avoidance. This would include the cost of any safety features involved
with the activity, such as guards on products, as well as investments in
safety, training, and education. The other broad item of accident costs
actors must consider before engaging in "risky" behavior is the cost
the activity imposes upon society. 6 Damages others suffer are as much
a cost of the activity as any prevention techniques in which the actor
engages.5
When deciding what to do and how to do it, actors will often
accurately take into account such costs as safety features because they
represent costs that actors must actually pay, in the layman's sense of
the word.5" Contrariwise, people might not accurately perceive the costs
their accidents impose upon others5 9 precisely because they do not always
"pay" these costs.
54. See Pierce, supra note 50, at 1296.
55. See generally G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 92.
56. Pierce, supra note 50, at 1290-95. Actually another component of the calculus
involves any impairment of the value of the activity which safety considerations impose;
if an activity has a lower utility after safety devices are factored in, society is paying a
price for that safety. This might be viewed most aptly as a "credit" for the manufacturer
in deciding what to spend on accident avoidance.
57. One commonly used measure of the accident costs that an activity imposes upon
others is the sum of damage awards or settlements in personal injury suits arising out
of the activity.
58. Of course, it is possible an actor might not be aware that certain costs it must
pay are attributable to the accident-causing activity and in that way may not properly
consider those as costs in relation to that activity. On a relatively simplistic level, a parent
may buy a safe to house her rare collection of cameos and may keep a handgun in the
safe that would otherwise be hidden in a closet where a child would be 500 more likely
to find it, play with it, and be injured. In actuality, part of the price of the safe is an
investment in protecting the child from handgun injuries, whereas the parent may attribute
all of the cost to protecting the cameos. Put a little differently, one might view the
reduced rate of handgun injuries to children as a beneficial externality of investing in the
safe to protect the cameos.
59. Likewise, actors may not accurately calculate the impairment on utility that
additional safety devices cause. See supra note 56. Inaccurate calculation of the second
component of accident costs would lead to an underinvestment in the activity rather than
an overinvestment. If the actor does not realize that the activity is more valuable without
the expensive safety precautions, he will perceive the cost of the activity with safety
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In order to understand how this might occur, consider how the
economist would have the actor take account of accident costs in deciding
how to act and what to do. To determine potential damages others may
suffer, the economist would start with the probability, or likelihood,
that an accident would arise if the actor engages in the activity, expressed
as a percentage. Then she would multiply that figure by the severity of
the accident if it occurs, expressed in monetary terms. This second part
of the formula, the severity of the accident, constitutes the costs that
an accident arising out of the activity would impose upon society.
Essentially, the economist would reduce the dollar damages that
others would suffer if an accident occurred by the likelihood of oc-
currence. This, then, is the ex ante cost of an accident, expressed in
dollar terms. It cannot be overemphasized that the actor is concerned,
when deciding what to do and how to do it, with the ex ante costs of
accidents, not the actual, after the fact, total costs of accidents. 60 In
deciding what to do and how to do it, the actor should compare this
ex ante accident cost with the amount it would cost to prevent the
accident. If the accident can be prevented for less than its ex ante cost,
then efficiency dictates the actor incur the costs of avoidance. Alter-
natively, if the cost of avoidance is greater than the ex ante cost of
potential accidents, the actor should not incur the accident avoidance
expense. He should engage in the activity as is.
b. The "Learned Hand Negligence Formula"
The Learned Hand formula for negligence6' is based on this very
economic analysis. If the burden of accident avoidance is less than the
probability of an accident occurring times the expected loss if the accident
does occur, an actor is negligent if he does not incur the costs of
avoidance. For the formula to work effectively, the actor must accurately
perceive the costs his accidents will impose upon society. Errors may
arise in two primary ways. First, the actor may err in estimating the
precautions as higher than it actually is, in which case he will do the activity with less
than optimal frequency. To this extent the failure to properly calculate the monetary
impact of the additional safety devices on the activity constitutes a positive externality.
60. For an accessible and lucid explanation of the importance of ex ante costs, see
R. Posner, supra note 9, § 4.5. One will note that the ex ante costs of accidents is the
"risk" side of Judge Learned Hand's negligence formula from United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611
(2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492, 61 S. Ct. 634 (1941).
61. See cases cited note 60. See also, R. Posner, supra note 9, § 6.2; Calabresi and
Hirschoff, supra note 46, at 1055.
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probability of an accident's occurrence. He may over-62 or underestimate
the chance his conduct will cause an accident. 63 Equally important, he
may inaccurately perceive the costs the activity imposes upon others. 64
Ironically, one of the potential causes of this misperception is not the
actor's "fault." It arises from the fact that one commonly noted measure
of the costs accidents impose upon society is damage awards and set-
tlements (which of course are influenced by damage awards). Should
those awards and settlements inaccurately reflect the costs accidents
impose upon society, an actor who utilizes such awards in his cost
calculations will not, by definition, act efficiently to avoid and prevent
62. The more risk averse the actor, the more likely he will overestimate the chance
an accident will occur. Insurance may be an effective way to deal with this risk aversion,
but then the moral hazard problem may arise. See generally Epstein, Products Liability
as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud. 645, 653 (1985). See supra text accompanying
notes 47-54 and infra text accompanying notes 247-53.
63. See generally G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 148-49. Calabresi's focus is on the
likelihood that a pedestrian will inaccurately perceive the possibility that he will be injured
when walking by a car; but, intuitively the same may be said of some actors.
Returning to the hypothetical posed earlier, see supra note 51. If the possibility of
having an accident when driving on the wrong side of the road in the hypothetical
community involved is 1/100, or 1%, and the damages suffered by third persons if an
accident occurs are $300, the ex ante cost of these accidents is $3. In order to assure
that the actor and others engage in this activity at an efficient level and in an efficient
manner, this $3 must be added to the actor's other "activity" costs such as gasoline,
time, driving clothes, etc.... If an accident costing $3 could be avoided by a $2
expenditure, the driver would act efficiently if he spent the $2 to avoid the accident.
Alternatively, if the $3 in accident costs could not be avoided for less than $3, it would
be inefficient to incur the expense of avoidance.
64. An important subset of this inadequate calculation category are people who do
not perceive that there are any accident costs at all attached to an activity and those
who may be aware of accident costs but who do not know that there is a chance that
they will have to pay those costs. That is accident costs, as to these actors, are externalized.
As Dean Calabresi noted, there is no point in imposing accident costs on someone, or
some group, who will not be influenced by those costs. In essence, deterrence fails as a
justification for these groups of people because allocating costs to them will have little
or no impact on their future behavior. G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 144-50. For a real
world example of a judge forced to wrestle with this problem, see Turner v. New Orleans
Public Services, Inc., 476 So. 2d 800 (La. 1985) where Justice Dennis wrote:
The degree of accident cost reduction which could be achieved by reducing the
recovery of careless pedestrians injured by negligent motorists is apt to be small.
Because pedestrians are an unorganized group, reduction of individual plaintiffs'
awards may not be communicated readily to other pedestrians or immediately
influence their conduct. On the other hand, pedestrians generally appear to be
in a substantially better position to avoid collisions with negligent drivers than,
for example, are laborers to escape injury by defective machinery with which
they are forced to work by economic circumstances. If the message that fault
reduces recovery is communicated to the pedestrian, he at least has greater
power and opportunity to heed it.
(Dennis, J., assigning additional reasons). Id. at 807.
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accidents. 65 This truism will be reexamined below in the context of
punitive damages. 66
A related point deals with the payment of costs, as opposed to the
awareness of ex ante accident costs. Arguably there is no reason that
the actor should ever have to pay these costs to anyone as long as he
takes them into account when deciding what to do and how to do it.67
But, there is the risk that one who never has to pay a "cost" will not
take that cost into account. Therefore, forcing actual payment of costs
is one way to force actors to take them into account. What may be
less controversial, but is perhaps of greater significance in the augmented
damages arena, is that efficiency and the accompanying notion of de-
terrence do not demand that the actor, even if he must pay accident
costs, must pay them to his victims. 68
65. Depending upon whether damages awards and the settlements that they influence
are too high or too low, there will either be too few or too many accidents. In the
context of augmented damage awards, the concern is with damages awards that are too
low.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 109-52.
67. This is in essence the heart of the theory of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See, e.g.,
A. Schwartz and R. Scott, Sales Law and the Contracting Process 26 (1982).
68. Quoting Judge Posner:
The association of negligence with purely compensatory damages has prompted
the erroneous impression that liability for negligence is intended solely as a
device for compensation. Its economic function is different; it is to deter une-
conomical accidents. As it happens, the right amount of deterrence is produced
by compelling negligent injurers to make good the victim's losses. Were they
forced to pay more (punitive damages), some economical accidents might also
be deterred; were they permitted to pay less than compensation, some unecon-
omical accidents would not be deterred. It is thus essential that the defendant
be made to pay damages and that they be equal to the plaintiff's loss. But
that the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an economic standpoint, a
detail. But an important one. First: it is necessary to the private enforcement
of tort law .... Second: if victims of negligent accidents are not compensated,
they will take some precautions for they know that the law of negligence will
not be administered so perfectly that all negligent accidents are in fact deterred.
R. Posner, supra note 9, § 6.12. Professor Morris noted a similar point in a "non-
economic" vein. Morris, supra note 7, at 1173-76.
One way, and perhaps the best, to handle the problem would be to require the actor
to seek out all those who he or she might injure and purchase the right to hurt them.
In the hypothetical discussed in supra notes 51 and 63, drivers who wanted to drive on
the wrong side would seek out their (potential) victims, negotiate over the value of possibly
injuring them by driving on the wrong side of the road, and then pay the victims an
agreed upon sum for the right to injure them-if an accident with them occurs. The
community would then have created a market in being injured by, driving on the wrong
side of the road. The problem is that it is, in the real world, impossible for an actor to
seek out all those whom he or she might injure and negotiate with them beforehand.
There are other problems as well. Efficient negotiations require that both sides have
perfect information. In our hypothetical, it is unlikely that either side would have perfect
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In any event, if we can force the actor to take into account all
relevant accident costs and to act with them in mind (whether paid,
not paid, or actually paid to victims) the actor will behave efficiently
in avoiding, preventing, and causing accidents. Society might take various
measures to encourage actors to take accident costs into account. 69 One
option is to shape tort rules to encourage actors to take all the costs
of their activities into account, thereby encouraging efficient behavior. 70
Other options include criminal sanctions, administrative controls, and
various combinations of all of the above.
3. Efficiency and Insurance
In addition to compensating and spreading risk, one may postulate
that insurance also has an efficiency-related function. One would expect
insurance rates to reflect the likely damages caused by an insured's
activities7' plus the administrative expenses necessary to provide insurance
and to fund the tort system itself.72 Insofar as the insured's premiums
reflect the likelihood of damage multiplied by the severity of damage
if an accident occurs, the premium is akin to the ex ante accident costs
that society would have the actor consider. 73 In this way, then, insurance
ideally forces the actor to pay the ex ante costs of any accidents he
information. Moreover, even with perfect information concerning the identity of injurers
and victims, it is very possible that potential victims would underestimate the chances
that they would be injured thereby demanding less from the would be wrong side driver
than $3, which in turn would mean that the driver would not be paying enough and
would overengage in the activity. See, e.g., Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed
Society, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 519, 521-23 (1978).
By way of disclaimer, let me categorically state that I do not mean to imply that the
compensation providing function of tort law is somehow unimportant or even of secondary
importance. My point is only that it is possible to theoretically separate compensation
from deterrence. Perhaps Aristotle was right in believing that the "moral claim for a
remedy is strongest when there is both a loss to plaintiff and a benefit to defendant."
D. Laycock, supra note 10, at 526. But deterrence can operate absent compensation. The
system might be less acceptable, if acceptable at all, but that real world possibility requires
discussion beyond the scope of this article.
69. In a sentence, this seems to be one of the important messages implicit in much
of the work of Dean Calabresi. See, e.g., G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 20; G. Calabresi
and P. Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (1978); Calabresi and Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability
in Torts, 14 J. Legal Stud. 585 (1985).
70. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972); Shavell,
Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980).
71. At least those activities covered by the policy.
72. Including, of course, a profit for the insurer.
73. This assumes that insurance is loss rated, an assumption that may not be justified
in all cases. In fact, one commentator has concluded that "insurance costs reflect only
crudely, if at all, variations in risks of accidents among firms and activities." Pierce,
supra note 50, at 1298.
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may cause. To the extent that insurance premiums accurately reflect the
ex ante accident costs of an activity, insurance performs a deterrence/
efficiency function.
C. Comparing Theory and the Real World-Does the American
System Efficiently Deter?
1. Compensation
How does the American system stack up in relation to accident
costs, deterrence, and efficiency? Efficiency requires the actor to ac-
curately take into account all accident costs before he engages in an
activity. 74 How does compensation or "making a victim whole" further
that end? There is no obvious way in which compensation furthers
efficiency. 7 However, there is a relationship between the two concepts
that provides some efficiency justifications for compensating tort victims.
First, note that absent some device requiring the actor to take
accident costs into account the actor may not do so. Thus,, compensation
at least operates as some threat to the actor that if he or she does not
take potential accident costs into account beforehand, bad things may
happen afterwards-liability for damages suffered by another.7 6 In this
vein, compensatory damages operate as a deterrent. 77 As a corollary,
one might expect that if, ex ante, the actor properly takes account of
potential accident costs, then liability would not attach, absent some
policy reason unrelated to efficiency. 78 As Dean Calabresi has pointed
out, we often shape legal rules for distributional rather than efficiency
reasons.7 9 Risk spreading and compensation, two frequently articulated
goals of tort law, s0 are distributional rather than efficiency considera-
tions.
Although the notion that the threat of paying compensation may
encourage people to consider accident costs before acting is at the heart
of the American law of torts, one is left with'some lingering doubts.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 67 & 68.
76. See, e.g., D. Laycock, supra note 10, at 14-17; R. Posner, supra note 9, § 6.12,
at 143 n.2.
77. F. Harper and F. James, supra note 32, at 743; Prosser and Keeton, supra note
19, at 6; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1796 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
78. This is the conclusion one necessarily draws from Judge Hand's negligence for-
mula. See supra text accompanying notes 61-70.
79. G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 18-20.
80. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 4; W. Prosser, J. Wade and V. Schwartz,
supra note 27, at 1-2.
81. G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 27-28, 39-67.
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How are we so sure that compensatory damages adequately represent
all the accident costs that we want people to consider ex ante? Are
there people who are injured but either do not or cannot sue under
our current laws? Are there damages the current system does not allow
the injured victim to recover that society might still want the actor to
take into account ex ante when determining his or her course of conduct?
From the actor's perspective, are we sure that we are not overdeterring?
Do those who recover and the damages they recover represent an ad-
equate proxy for the ex ante amounts that we want actors to "pay?"
Or, by making actors pay the full damages that some people suffer,
are we asking them to pay too much?
8 2
In addition to forcing actors to pay some accident costs, compen-
sation performs a second efficiency related function. The tort system
operates as a data bank providing actors access to information on the
number of accidents that do occur, the damages that accident victims
suffer, and the dollar value of those damages.8" In this regard the "fault"
system facilitates actors' ex ante calculations by providing them with
the data they need to calculate the value of the damages that their
activities impose on others. Given a large number of similarly situated
82. If an actor's conduct has a 1% chance of causing $300 in accidents, the relevant
ex ante accident cost of the activity is $3 (excluding any safety precautions that the actor
already takes). If the law requires the actor to pay $300 to the victim if the actor acts
inefficiently, the law assures adequate deterrence only if the risk only occurs one in one
hundred times. But the one in one hundred chance that the accident has of occurring
each time that an actor engages in the activity is mutually independent. That is, the
unlucky actor may cause an accident three times in the 100 times that he drives on the
wrong side of the road, whereas the lucky actor may go 200 without causing any accident
at all. Under this scenario the unlucky actor will be overcharged for engaging in the
activity, whereas the lucky one will be undercharged. Consequently, there will not be
optimal deterrence. The unlucky driver may stop driving or overinvest in safety. The
lucky driver may drive on the wrong side of the road too often. Of course to the extent
that the lucky actor's good fortune is attributable to his or her development of a safer
way to engage in the activity, efficiency may well be served. To the extent that it is due
only to Lady Luck, we will have encouraged the unlucky actor to underinvest in safety
and to overinvest in the activity. Put differently, the likelihood that an accident occurs
is probabilistic. Accidents are random events. Only as we increase the number of persons
engaging in the activity do we begin to get any real feel that our ex ante predictions are
accurate. Moreover, despite large numbers, the occurrence of accidents is random. The
1% chance of an accident arising is an average for all actors who are sufficiently similarly
situated. This random nature of accidents is one of the linchpins of the operation of
liability insurance markets. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 35, at 1521.
83. In essence then, if the severity of accidents is measured by the damage that they
do to others and that damage is gauged by the compensatory damages that a court will
award, an assumption that this piece questions, compensatory awards serve as the severity
portion of the Learned Hand algebraic definition of negligence.
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actors, over time damages paid might be expected to somewhat equal
the actual value ex ante of an activity's accident costs.,
2. Non-Compensatory Awards
As noted, certain American tort rules are not grounded in com-
pensation. The'collateral source rule provides that a plaintiff can recover
from the defendant items of damages for which it has already received
compensation from some collateral source, such as an insurer. 5 The
collateral source rule can lead to double compensation. Traditionally,8 6
however, courts were willing to tolerate that windfall to the plaintiff,
arguably because allowing recovery required defendants to take into
account the costs their conduct imposed upon others.
The entire doctrine of restitution is another example of an instance
where the law awards damages for reasons other than compensation.
Damages in restitution are measured not by the loss that the plaintiff
has suffered (the proper measure of compensatory damages), but by the
gain the defendant has enjoyed.87 Scholars and judges have postulated
that this is because measuring damages by the amount of the loss that
the plaintiff has suffered would not adequately deter the defendant from
acting similarly in the future.88 Restitution is employed in certain types.
of torts cases as the proper measure of damages. These cases include
84. This is the conclusion one would also reach by looking at an insurance pool
over time. Premiums would, of course, exceed accident payouts inasmuch as the premium
would include a fee for the insurer's aggregation and monitoring services.
85. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, at §§ 3.6 and 8.10; Restatement of Torts § 920,
comment e (1939).
86. See sources cited supra note 85; recently some states have enacted legislation
limiting or overruling the collateral source rule either entirely or in limited contexts, such
as medical malpractice. Alaska Stat. § 09.17.070 (Supp. 1990); (1986) Conn. Pub. Acts
86-338 § 4. Long Beach Community Hospital v. Jordan, 248 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Cal. App.
1988) (modification of the collateral source rule by Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.1); State Farm
Ins. Co. v. Nalbone, 569 A.2d 71 (1989) ("The no-fault statute, 21 Del.C. § 2116(g),
limits the collateral source rule .. "); Thomas v. Clark, 373 S.E.2d 668 (Ga. App. 1988)
("[T]he effect of the collateral source rule was radically modified by ... OCGA § 51-
12-1 . . . (eff. July 1, 1987)."); English v. New England Medical Center, 541 N.E.2d 329
(Sup. Jud. Ma. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990) ("[M]odification of the collateral
source rule pursuant 'to G.L. c. 231, §§ 60F, 60G, and 60H (1988 ed.)"); Gjovik v.
Breiland, No. C8-88-1639 (Minn. Jan. 10, 1989) (1989 WL 465) ("[Plast lost wages which
were eliminated under the collateral source rule. Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (1988) .... ");
State Farm Ins. Co. v. Keefe, No. 57035 (Ohio Jul. 20, 1989) (1989 WL 80997) ("Clearly,
R.C. 2744.0(B) was enacted ... to limit ... by eliminating the collateral source rule . .
87. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, at § 4.1.
88. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, at § 4.1; Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397, 1408-09
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 918, 106 S. Ct. 246 (1985), 473 U.S. 906, 105 S. Ct.
3529 (1985).
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conversion cases 9 and trademark infringement and copyright cases,9°
which, although governed primarily by statutes, 91 are based in common
law tort actions. 92 Punitive damages are another area where plaintiffs
recover an amount not grounded in compensation.
3. The Reality of Insurance
Likewise, there are differences between the theoretical and real world
where insurance is concerned. Insurers, in setting rates, are obviously
concerned with more than efficiency. 93 They set rates and define actuarial
groups based not only on maximizing efficient accident avoidance and
occurrence but also on administrative convenience, insurance regulation,
and profitability. 94 For instance, an ideal insurer may group various
actors together for purposes of efficiency when, in fact, an actual insurer
would group them with some larger contingent because of administrative
convenience. 9 Another potential problem with the deterrence function
of insurance is that many actors purchase broad all-risk policies not
89. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 5.15, at 415-17; Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1929).
90. Trademark, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1989); D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 6.5, at 480-
81; Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 36 S. Ct. 269 (1916);
D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 6.3, at 446-50; Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp.,
162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
91. Trademark, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1989); Copyright, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1989).
92. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 5.16 (conversion and action in assumpsit); id. § 6.5
(trademark and copyright).
93. G. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 47-50.
94. See, e.g., id. at 50.
95. Insurance companies, in setting insurance premiums, are concerned with the
riskiness of the insured activity. But they are also concerned with their administrative
ability to classify and subclassify activities. For instance, returning to the wrong side of
the road driver, statistics might indicate that driving on 'the wrong side of the road at
night in a yellow car with The Rolling Stones playing on the radio was more, likely to
result in an accident with severe injuries than driving on the wrong side of the road in
a red car while reciting nursery rhymes on the car phone to one's paramour. However,
from an administrative standpoint, an insurance company is unlikely to want to subclassify
risks to such an extent. It is more likely that the underwriter will create one category
for driving on the wrong side of the road and will charge the same premium to all drivers
within that category even though, as we have seen, some wrong side drivers are riskier
than others. In the real world, of course, it is impossible for an insurance company to.
even categorize drivers to the extent that we have postulated. Drivers are unlikely to
admit .that they drive on the wrong side of the road beforehand and it will be difficult
for an insurer to discover such tendencies at manageable costs. On the problem of imperfect
information in the insurance acquisition process, see generally Epstein, supra note 62, at
653-54. Instead drivers are grouped based upon easier to administer (and detect) char-,
acteristics such as prior accidents, prior traffic violations, sex, marital status, age, and
performance in school.
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tied to particular risks.9 Fortunately, there is a limit on an insurer's
ability to broadly group actors and risks together.
Adverse selection limits an insurer's ability to pool high risk activities
and actors with lower risk activities and actors .97 In such a loosely
formed pool, lower risk people are paying more for insurance than if
they were not grouped with the higher risks. 98 Consequently, lower risks
will leave the pool when they discover this situation, assuming there is
a cheaper alternative 9 Thus, the insurer is pressured to group risks as
narrowly as profitably possible, and in fact insurance works most ef-
fectively when this is the case.' °°
4. A Theoretical/Reality Recap
Despite the obvious lack of perfect correlation between the present
system and an optimally deterrent one, the current scheme does have
some positive efficiency-related incentives. Tort damages operate as a
proxy for accident costs imposed upon others. Actors use these judgments
to calculate the severity of threatened injuries in monetary terms-a
necessary element in Learned Hand's negligence formula.' 0' Likewise,
insurance premiums, to the extent that they are based upon the potential
losses that insureds may cause, operate as a charge roughly equalling
the ex ante accident costs of the insured's covered activities. 0 2
96. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 50, at 1299. Actually, the standard general liability
policy provides an apt example.
97. See generally Epstein, supra note 62, at 650-52; Priest, supra note 35, at 1539-
50.
98. Priest, supra note 35, at 1540-41.
99. This cheaper alternative may include another carrier who can more efficiently
pool risks and offer insurance at a lower premium, self-insurance, or even going bare.
See id. See also Pierce, supra note 50, at 1298. In actuality, lower risks are probably
always grouped with higher risks and the whole issue of adverse selection, in this context,
becomes one of degree. Various lower risks will drop out at various points depending on
the variance between the risks they perceive they pose and the premiums that they are
forced to pay. In actuality, one may reasonably ask if part of the current insurance crisis
and what Professor Priest calls the unravelling of risk pools, Priest, supra note 35, at
1553, is not attributable, in part not to the actual grouping of high risks and low risks
but to the perception of insureds that they are low risks grouped with high risks when,
in fact, they may be high risks themselves.
100. Priest, supra note 35, at 1540. At this point another disclaimer is in order. This
piece is not designed nor intended to be a defense of the current fault system supplemented
as it is by private and social insurance. No doubt if we started over we could design a
system that was more efficient and cheaper to operate. Likewise, we could certainly design
a system that did a better job of compensating injured victims and spreading the costs
of risks. But the point made here is, given the system we have, insurance may have some
efficiency-oriented function.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 61-70.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 42, 71-73, and 93-100.
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But in order for our current system to operate most effectively,
some real relationship must exist between the accident costs society wants
the actor to consider beforehand and the damages we force the actor
to pay after the fact. The damages we award to compensate plaintiffs
in personal injury cases and the categories .of accident costs we want
actors to consider ex ante should highly correlate. If actual damages
awarded in tort suits do not reflect the costs we want actors to consider
ex ante, but the system relies upon those actual awards as a "definition"
of accident costs, then the system will not optimally deter. 03 If the
damages awarded in tort suits are less than the total costs we want
actors to discount ex ante, we are encouraging people to consider less
than all of the costs of that activity and to overengage in it.'0 Likewise,
if we overcompensate accident victims we are encouraging actors to
underengage in the activity. 05
One point concerning the relationship between tort compensation
and optimal deterrence bears reemphasis.' °0 Deterrence does not require
the actor (tortfeasor) to actually pay the people that he injures-it merely
requires that he consider those costs.107 Although this section has in-
dicated that the notion of tort recovery by victims intended as com-
pensation, augmented by insurance, may work towards the goal of
optimal deterrence, nothing in the notion of efficiency requires its im-
plementation via some system assuring compensation. Compensation is
just one way to help achieve the goal. To the extent that damages
undercompensate those victims we allow recovery, the system is inef-
ficient. Likewise, by not allowing certain victims to recover compensation
the system underdeters. Moreover, if compensatory damages do not
adequately provide for all the costs accidents impose upon society, the
103. See generally supra text accompanying notes 43-70.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
105. Id.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70.
107. Once again, assume driving on the wrong side of the road created a one in one
hundred chance of causing $300 damages and there are 100 potential victims. If the
would-be wrong side driver found each of those 100 people and paid each of them $3,
efficiency demands would be met. Then if one of them were hurt, demanding additional
compensation would overdeter the actor. Alternatively, if the state required the actor
beforehand to pay $300 into a state fund for accident costs, optimal deterrence would
demand no more. Or, if one of the 100 were injured and the actor paid that one $300,
efficiency goals would be satisfied. As stated earlier, arguably, there is no reason for the
actor to pay $300 to anybody or anything as long as he or she takes those accident costs
into account in plotting his or her marginal cost curve for the activity. See supra text
accompanying notes 75, 76, and 78-84. But, as Judge Posner has pointed out, R. Posner,
supra note 9, § 6.12, at 143 n.2, the tort system provides victims with an incentive to
sue the actor who misbehaves, thereby providing an arguably more effective incentive to
potential misbehavers to actually take accident costs into account. But once again, note
that deterrence arguably does not require compensation.
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tort system frustrates optimal deterrence, absent some device to en-
courage an actor to take all those costs into account. 0 Before turning
to a device which might serve that function, the augmented award, it
is appropriate to examine one that, to date, has not-the punitive
damages award.
III. PUNITrVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages exist to punish and allegedly deter the defendant,
and others like him, from engaging in socially reprehensible behavior.1°9
I say allegedly deter because in the punitive damages context, deterrence
has taken a back seat to punishment. Indeed, as noted in the intro-
duction, critics of the doctrine have focused on punitive damages as an
inappropriate use of civil procedure. The punitive damages debate has
raged for at least 150 years-focusing on their penal nature." 0 Today's
108. Three such devices that America now employs are criminal sanctions, civil fines,
and administrative regulation. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319 (1989), demonstrating each type: Administrative Penalties, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)
(1989); Criminal Penalties, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1989); and Civil Penalties, 33 U.S.C. §
1319(d) (1989).
109. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9, at 204.
110. The earliest treatise writers discussing the law of damages indicated that damages
primarily exist to compensate the injured victim, to place her in the position that she
would have been in had the defendant not committed the tort. See, e.g., G. Field, supra
note 32, § 32, at 28 ("The general principle, recognized in the measure of damages, is
that of compensation."); A. Greenleaf, supra note 32, §§ 253 and 273 ("Damages are
given as compensation, recompense, or satisfaction to the plaintiff, for an injury actually
received by him from the defendant. They should be precisely commensurate with the
injury, neither more nor less; and this whether it be to his person or estate."); J. Sayer,
The Law of Damages B (1792) ("DAMAGES are a pecuniary Recompense for an Injury.");
T. Sedgwick, supra note 32 (Professor Horwitz has called Sedgwick's treatise on damages
"the most brilliant and boldly innovative American antebellum legal treatise."); M. Hor-
witz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, 83 (1977). When these men wrote,
punitive damages were already recognized in both England and the United States, see,
e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, 1763 Lofft. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763); Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils.
K.B. 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371
(1851) (whether a court can award punitive damages "will not admit of argument.").
Field discusses them in chapter 6 of his treatise on damages. Earlier he points out in
relationship to the maxim that the primary purpose of damages in tort was to compensate
that "[in a great majority of cases, especially in actions for torts, the maxim, in its
literal sense, is much too restricted." G. Field, supra, § 45. Greenleaf admitted no such
doubt and his failure to recognize the validity of punitive damages in any sense served
as the basis for the debate on. the issue between he and Sedgwick. Modern commentators
continue to emphasize the reparative function of damages. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, at
135-38; F. Harper, F. James, 0. Gray, The Law of Torts § 25.1 at 490 (2d ed. 1986)
("The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for
the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty.") (emphasis in original); see
also sources cited supra note 33; Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, at 5-6 ("There
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critics continue to call for the abolition or modification of punitive
remains a body of law whch [sic] is directed toward the compensation of individuals,
rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered within the scope of their
legally recognized interests generally, rather than one interest only, where the law considers
that compensation is required. This is the law of torts."). Against this backdrop the
question of punitive damages has loomed as an inescapable contradiction. In one of the
major articles written in recent years on the subject of punitive damages, Professor Ellis
noted that "[tihe concept of punitive damages lies in the borderline that both bridges
and separates criminal law and torts." Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1982).
One commonly accepted theory of the evolution of punitive damages suggests that
punitive damages developed as the relationship between judge and jury matured. The
earliest references to punitive damages date back at least to The Code of Hammurabi,
see Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day
Society, 49 UMKC L. Rev. 1, 2 (1980). In Exodus 21:37, the authors of the Bible state:
"When a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters or sells it, he shall restore five
oxen for the one ox, and four sheep for the one sheep." As Belli points out, the doctrine.
of punitive damages took its place in the English common law relatively late, around the
thirteenth century. Belli, supra, at 3; Ingram, supra note 5, at 206-07; J. Ghiardi and J.
Kircher, Punitive Damages: Law and Practice (1986 and Supp. 1988). Ghiardi and Kircher
note that one of the theories for the development of punitive damages is that even as
courts began to develop tools to set aside or modify jury verdicts judges still were reluctant
to do so and the doctrine of punitive damages served to insulate the judiciary from the
criticism that might accompany the reduction of the jury's award. Id. § 1.02, at 4-5. The
authors quote from Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205-07, 95 Eng. Rep. 768-69 (1763)
to illustrate their point:
Upon the whole, I am of the opinion the damages are not excessive; and that
it is very dangerous for the Judges to intermeddle in damages for torts; it must
be a glaring case instead of outrageous damages in a tort, and which all mankind
at first blush must think so, to induce a Court to grant a new trial for excessive
damages.
Id. § 1.02, at 4. Others trace the development of the doctrine of punitive damages in
England to the existence of amercements prior to the time of the Magna Carta. An
amercement was an amount that a litigant paid to the Crown as what Justice Blackmun
in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2917 (1989), called
an "all purpose royalty penalty." Amercements were employed for a broad variety of
purposes including "fining" the tortfeasor. See generally Massey, The Excessive Fines
Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1233 (1987)
and other sources cited in Justice O'Connor's partial concurrence/partial dissent. Browning-
Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2927. Whatever the relationship between amercements and punitive
damages, the Court still held that the eighth amendment's excessive fines clause was not
triggered by an award of punitive damages in a suit between private litigants. See supra
text accompanying note 36.Almost from the outset of the Republic, most American courts recognized the doctrine
of punitive damages. Belli cites a case from 1791 involving breach of a promise to marry.
Belli, supra, citing Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (1791). At first, judges had no
power to modify jury verdicts. Professor Ellis provides a complete but manageable history
of the early development of punitive damages in England in Ellis, supra, at 12-20. Later,
as this power was recognized, judges still were hesitant to use it. Id. Thus, when judges
needed some justification for allowing an otherwise clearly excessive verdict to stand,
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damages in personal injury cases."' Many do so on the same grounds
cited in the mid 1800's-the civil law did not ever and does not now
exist to punish." 2
A. The Punitive Hornbook of Punitive Damages
Just as many of the philosophical questions surrounding punitive
damages have not changed, the law has similarly been relatively static
punishment was one justification. Id. One might argue, however, that by Greenleaf's time
the' evolution of the judge/jury relationship had advanced to a point where punitive
damages were unnecessary and undesirable and that was precisely his contention.
Sedgwick, the seminal American scholar on damages, countered Greenleaf arguing that
punitive damages served a positive function in a limited number of cases where the
defendant's behavior was beyond the bounds of tolerable human conduct and that it was
desirable to send a strong signal to the defendant and others that society would not
tolerate such conduct. Interestingly, Professor Horwitz notes that outside the area of
punitive damages, Sedgwick applauded efforts to make the law of damages more predictable
and certain. He fostered the notion that the question of the amount of compensatory
damages was an issue of law for the court and that a judge had the power to set aside
excessive jury verdicts. M. Horwitz, supra, at 83-84. In the 150 years or so since those
gentlemen wrote, the debate over punitive damages has continued to rage.
Professor Clarence Morris, in a 1931 article that is still cited as an important piece in
the history of punitive damages analysis, postulated that one continuing justification for
the existence of punitive damages was the inefficiency of the criminal law where many
criminals are not apprehended and penalties are not specifically tailored to the individual
but fixed in advance by the legislature. Morris, supra note 7, at 1194-98. A recent
bibliography of punitive damages literature cites over-four hundred books and articles
dealing with the subject. R. Schloerb, R. Blatt, R. Hammesfahr and L. Nugent, Punitive
Damages: A Guide to the Insurability of Punitive Damages in the United States and its
Territories 319-41 (1988).
The focus of the debate in both the law reviews and the courts has centered on the
proper role of the, courts and the allocation of functions between the civil and criminal
law.
Representatively, Prosser and Keeton have titled their section dealing with punitive
damages: "Tort, Crime, and Punitive Damages." Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, §
2, at 7. This section appears in the first chapter of the book which deals, in part, with
such broad issues as what is a tort and what policies drive tort law. The authors apparently
view the issue of punitive damages and their relationship to criminal law as important
in defining the scope and/or purposes of tort law, rather than as a subpart of tort law
or tort damages.
Ill. See, e.g., Punitive Damages: A Constructive Examination, 1986 A.B.A. Sec.
Litigation, Special Committee on Punitive Damages (1986); Ellis, supra note 110; Ghiardi,
The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 Forum 411 (1972); Ingram, supra note 5; Owen,
Civil Punishment, supra note 4; Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Owen,
Problems]; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev.
1257 (1976) [hereinafter Owen, Products Liability Litigation]; Sales and Cole, supra note
5; American College of Trial Lawyers, Report on Punitive Damages of the Committee
on Special Problems in the Administration of Justice (1989) [hereinafter ACTL Report]
(The ACTL Report contains a short but well-selected bibliography of pieces arguing for
the abolition of punitive damages, the modification thereof, and those who would preserve
the status quo. Id. at 4 n.19).
112. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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until very recently." 3 Thus, in the abstract, the issues of whether a
plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages and what factors the judge or
jury should consider in deciding how much to award are the same today
as they were in 1850." 4 Certainly mass tort cases" 5 and the recent efforts
of tort reformers" 6 have led to some new problems and peculiar twists.
For the most part, however, the substantive law relating to the entitle-
ment and the amount of punitive damages is the same as it was 150
years ago. The law, like the philosophical debate, has been grounded
in punitive or penal concerns.
For instance, in most states, the plaintiff in order to recover punitive
damages must show the defendant engaged in worse activity than mere
negligence."' The defendant must have committed an intentional tort or
otherwise acted wilfully, wantonly, maliciously, recklessly, or outra-
geously.
In order to be liable for punitive damages, a defendant must have
engaged in some morally blameworthy conduct deserving of punishment.
In instructing juries on the proper amount to award as punitive damages,
courts typically advise them to award an amount sufficient to punish
the defendant and to deter the defendant and others like him from
engaging in similar conduct in the future." s This deterrence is not
efficiency related; it is punishment oriented. Courts also tell juries to
consider the wealth of the defendant, the severity of harm with which
the plaintiff was threatened, the relationship between the harm that the
plaintiff suffered or with which he was threatened, the amount of
113. In this vein, Ghiardi and Kircher state the following in their treatise:
Possibly it is time for a thorough re-examination of all of the rules and
procedures applicable to punitive damages. In the preparation of this
work we gained the impression that some courts tend to repeat, as if by
rote, old rules on the subject as one would intone an ancient ritual.
Little consideration appears to be given to their substance. The rules of
stare decisis should never be a commitment to intellectual stagnation.
J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, § 2.13.
114. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9, at 218-19; Ellis, supra note 110, at 20-37; G.
Field, supra note 32, § 83; Mallor and Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled
Approach, 31 Hastings L.J. 639, 666-69 (1980); T. Sedgwick, supra note 32, at 520.
115. See, e.g., Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053 decision vacated
after reconsideration, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989); ACTL Report, supra note 111,
at 20-26; D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9, at 212-14; Owen, Problems, supra note 111.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 125-30 & 321-31.
117. See, e.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life-Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675
(1986); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9,
at 205-08; Ellis, supra note 110, at 20-21; Mallor and Roberts, supra note 114, at 651;
Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 2, at 9-10; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908
(1965).
118. See Instructions quoted in J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, ch. 11;
ACTL Report, supra note 111, at 28; Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel, Louisiana
Jury Instructions 83-84 (3d ed. 1989).
1990]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
compensatory damages awarded, the egregiousness of the defendant's
conduct, the amount of any other punitive damages awards the defendant
had to pay or is threatened with paying, and any criminal punishment
the defendant suffered or may suffer as a result of the same conduct
forming the basis of the plaintiff's tort suit." 9 Most of these factors
are designed and discussed in reference to how much punishment is
needed, not in reference to efficiency and accident avoidance.
Appellate courts have traditionally reversed punitive damage assess-
ments only if they "shocked the conscience. "120 Recently courts have
grown more willing to-review and reverse, or revise downward, punitive
damage awards. Still, there are cries for greater reform. 2' Aside from
the shock the conscience standard, appellate courts have traditionally
relied upon the oft-cited rule that punitive damages must bear a rea-
sonable relationship to compensatory damages or else they will be re-
duced. 22 There is an aspect of the "punishment must fit the crime" to
this reasonable relationship rule.
Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.'23 held that the
eighth amendment's excessive fines clause does not apply in a case
between private parties. 124 The Court's holding, however, did not un-
dermine the traditional wisdom that the focus in a punitive damages
case is on punishment.
B. Recent Statutory Changes
These general rules, as well as the underlying purposes allegedly
served by punitive damages awards, remain controversial today. In many
states, and also at the federal level, punitive damages are the target of
tort reformers.'25 Recent legislation has made certain changes in rules
119. See the sources cited supra note 118. See also Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); Mallor and Roberts, supra note 114,
at 666-69. See also infra text accompanying notes 273-87.
120. Owen, Products Liability Litigation, supra note l1l, at 1321-22.
121. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 4, at 108-12; see also Sales and Cole,
supra note 5; Mallor and Roberts, supra note 114.
122. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9, at 210-11; Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19,
§ 2, at 14-15.
123. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
124. See supra note 6.
125. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, at 2 (Supp. 1988). Rep. Thomas A. Luken
recently introduced a product liability reform bill in the House, Product Liability Reform
Act of 1989, H.R. 2700, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), which, although it does not
establish a culpable state at which a plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages, does
expressly provide that punitive damages cannot be awarded against a defendant who is
merely negligent. Under the bill, a plaintiff would have to establish his or her entitlement
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governing the recoverability of punitive damages. Some states now re-
quire that the plaintiff establish his or her right to recover punitives by
clear and convincing evidence. 12 6 Other states achieved the same result
judicially. 127 Colorado has gone so far as to require that the plaintiff
prove his or her right to punitive damages beyond a reasonable doubt,
an obvious analogue to the punishment aspects of the doctrine. 28 Other
states have placed caps on the amount of recoverable punitive damages.' 29
Some states have passed legislation authorizing the bifurcation of punitive
damages cases separating the liability/compensatory damages aspects of
the case from the punitive damages aspect.' 30
to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence, the court could bifurcate com-
pensatory damage and punitive damage aspects of the case, and manufacturers of drugs
and medical devices approved by the FDA prior to marketing would have a defense to
punitive damages actions absent some fraudulent withholding of information or misrep-
resentation to the FDA. See generally 17 PSLR 614-16 (1989).
126. Ala. Code § 6-11-20 (Supp. 1989); Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1989); Cal.
Civil Code § 3294 (West Supp. 1990); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 549.20(1) (West 1988); Mont.
Code Ann. § 27-1-221(5) (1989); and Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.925 (1988). Fla. Stat. Ann. §
768.73 (Supp. 1990), and Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987), have adopted the
clear and convincing standard but only insofar as the plaintiff seeks punitives in addition
to a presumptive cap.
127. See, e.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675
(1986); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985).
128. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-127 (1987).
129. In some states the amount of punitive damages is capped by an absolute dollar
limit. Kansas Stat. Ann.. § 60-3402 (Supp. 1989) (punitive damages in medical malpractice
cases limited to lesser of $3,000,000 or 25% of the defendant's highest gross income for
the five years preceding of the tort. In others the cap is based on the amount of
compensatory damages awarded). N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-d (1983 & Supp. 1989);
Oklahoma Stat. App. Tit. 23, § 9 (1987) (punitives limited to an amount equal to actual
damages absent clear and convincing evidence of wrongful conduct); Tex. Civ. Proc. &
Rem. Code Ann. §§ 41.001-.008 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (punitive damages limited to four
times actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater; the limit is inapplicable to cases
involving malice or intentional torts). Some of these caps are only presumptive and a
plaintiff can recover a greater amount of punitive damages if he, in essence, rebuts the
presumption by showing that the defendant's conduct was particularly Egregious. See
statutes cited supra notes 126-28. See also Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1989) (punitives
limited to $250,000 unless the defendant engaged in a practice or pattern of intentional
wrongful conduct, actual malice, or defamation); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987)
(punitive damages can be no more than actual damages unless the defendant's wrongful
conduct continued during the pendency of the case in which event the court may increase
the punitive award to three times the actual damages awarded); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-
5.1(g) (Supp. 1989) ($250,000 cap unless the defendant had the specific intent to harm
or the case is a products liability case).
130. Cal. Civ. Code § 3295 (West Supp. 1990); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp.
1989); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 510.263 (Vernon Supp. 1990); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-221
(1989). See generally Owen, Problems, supra note 111, at 52-53; Demarest and Jones,
Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in the Public
Interest?, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 797, 831-33 (1987) (bifurcation should be available only in
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C. Punitive Damages and Efficiency
1. Classic Deterrence
All of these recent changes seem aimed at the doctrine as we know
it. None are geared towards making punitive damages a more efficient
deterrent. But one of the articulated purposes of punitive damages is
deterrence. Indeed, defenders of punitive damages in tort cases point
to the alleged deterrence rationale as justification.13 1 But interestingly,
as criminal law scholars have long pointed out, deterrence is also one
of the goals of punishment.3 2 Jailing a man may well have some effect
the rare cases where the defendant faces mass tort liability and the multiple punitive
damages awards); Mallor and Roberts, supra note 114, at 664-66 (the jury, after proper
instruction, should decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages
and then the judge should award the amount of those damages); Owen, Products Liability
Litigation, supra note 111, at 1319-21 (Judge should set amount of punitive damages
after the jury has decided that the plaintiff is entitled to them); ACTL Report, supra
note 111, at 18-19 (calling for bifurcation, and possibly trifurcation, in order to protect
defendants from the prejudice associated with litigating the issue of liability for compen-
satory damages and liability for punitive damages together).
Many of the bifurcation proposals are driven by the notion that if the jury hears about
the wealth of the defendant before it has decided the basic liability question, the jury
may well return a decision against the defendant on the issue of compensatory damages
merely because the defendant is wealthy. Sales and Cole, supra note 5, at 1147-48
("Permitting the fact finder to consider evidence of a wrongdoer's wealth is really nothing
more than a camouflaged mechanism designed to encourage large punitive assessments.
In essence, it is a procedural device that promotes the redistribution of wealth in society.").
Likewise, if the jury hears that the defendant has been subjected to criminal penalties
and/or paid (or simply'been assessed) other punitive damages awards, those facts may
influence the jury's decision on liability even though they are generally irrelevant for that
purpose and inadmissible. See generally Owen, Problems, supra note 111, at 52-53.
131. The great Clarence Morris pointed out nearly sixty years ago that tort necessarily
has a reparative as well as an admonitory function. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 7, at
1173. As he so eloquently stated:
The value of the liability with fault rules is found in the coupling of the
admonitory and the reparative functions [of tort law]; and in the absence
of a need for discouraging undesirable behavior, there is often no jus-
tification for compensating plaintiffs at defendants' expense. The large
portion of our tort law in which liability is dependent on fault can only
be used to compensate plaintiffs when there are defendants deserving of
punishment. As long as .the liability with fault rules are retained, the law
of torts will have an admonitory function even though the doctrine of
punitive damages is abandoned. So punishment in tort actions is not
anomalous (if anomalous means unusual); and punitive damage practice
is only one of many iieans of varying the size of money judgments in
view of the admonitory function.
Id. at 1177.
132. See W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law §,5 (1972).
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upon his future behavior, as well as upon the future behavior of others
who receive notice of the first man's jailing and are in a position to
choose whether to do what he did. Fear of punishment, whether it be
loss of life or liberty, a criminal fine, or even a punitive damages
judgment, may shape future behavior. We might call this classical de-
terrence. However, this notion of deterrence is not as subtle as the
Calabresi notion of deterrence. As noted, he used the word to mean
deterring inefficient investments in accident causing behavior (or safety)
by forcing actors to take account of all of the costs of their behavior.
2. Punitive Damages and Efficiency
Some scholars 3' have undertaken an economic, efficiency-oriented
analysis of punitive damages. They have carved out relatively narrow
areas where they believe punitive damages may be efficient. 3 4 For in-
stance, Professor Ellis has postulated that punitive damages are appro-
priate in only three types of cases: (1) where the probability of liability
is greater than the probability of loss,'" (2) where the compensatory
133. Several writers have doubted the role punitives can play in efficiency oriented
deterrence. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 110; Ingram, supra note 5; Owen, Problems, supra
note 111; Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 123
(1982); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 143-44 (after noting the anomalous nature of many
current punitive damages rules when viewed from a deterrence perspective, he states: "The
deterrence theory thus badly fails the descriptive test: there is almost nothing in the
common law of punitive damages that it clarifies, and there are central features in that
law that it contradicts.").
134. See infra text accompanying notes 247-62. See also Cooter, Economic Analysis
of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79, 89, 98 (1982):
The model ... highlights three broad characteristics of an economic view
of punitive damages: (1) punitive damages should be restricted to inten-
tional faults; (2) these faults will usually violate the legal standard of
care by a wide margin; and (3) the awards for punitive damages should
be large .... [P]unitive damages should be regarded as an unusual meas-
ure, appropriate only for gross, intentional fault. Punitive damages should
not be used to correct small imperfections in computing damages or in
bringing suits... . . [Piunitive damages should be computed at a level that
offsets the illicit pleasure of noncompliance or the exceptional costs of
compliance that motivated the injurer. Fortunately, this computation does
not have to be exact to achieve deterrence. Finally, punitive damages
should be awarded in strict liability cases only if the plaintiff can prove
intentional fault.
135. Ellis, supra note 110, at 25-26. In this category of cases Ellis includes torts such
as fraud which is often difficult to detect and always difficult to prove. He also includes
oppression by public officials and other intentional torts involving actual malice or reck-
lessness such as: "robbery, conversion, and rape" where he postulates there are difficulties
of "identifying and apprehending the perpetrator."
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damages a court will award are less than the loss, 3 6 and (3) where the
defendant's subjective gain from certain behavior is greater than the
cost the law recognizes as compensatory damages. 3 7
The last category includes cases where the defendant gets some illicit
benefit from his tortious activity that the law does not recognize.' That
is, the defendant may receive great pleasure in injuring someone, pleasure
which may be greater than the compensatory damages the law awards.'3 9
The law, however, may not recognize the gains the defendant enjoys, 40
even though to him the gains, ex ante, exceed the loss.' 4' A punitive
damages award forces the defendant to pay more than mere compen-
sation in the hopes that he and others like him will not repeat the
conduct. Ellis' first category includes cases where the defendant may
expect to escape detection, or identification. 42 Ellis concludes that there
are not many cases in his second category' 43-where compensatory dam-
ages are less than loss.' 4
136. Id. at 26-31. Ellis includes three types of cases in this category: those where there
is no legal remedy (he essentially relegates this subcategory to a historical footnote given
the expansion of compensatory damages for such items as emotional distress); those where
losses fall on persons other than the victim (again he notes the supposedly declining
significance of this category given the growth of loss of consortium claims, although he
does point out that all of these losses are not compensated and even under the expanding
concepts of who is a proper plaintiff in a personal injury suit there may be real uncom-
pensated societal losses in the form of a loss of security or in the costs that self-help
imposes upon all of us); and those cases where the loss cannot be readily translated into
monetary terms (he also relegates this category to minor importance by pointing out that
frequently in tort cases losses cannot be easily translated into monetary units, that justifying
punitives because compensatory damages are hard to value assumes that hard to value
damages are undervalued which is not necessarily the case and that if there is no market
to gauge the proper amount of compensatory damages the lack of that same market
makes it impossible to value punitive damages).
137. Id. at 31-33.
138. Id. See also Professor Laycock's summary of Ellis' position in D. Laycock, supra
note 10, at 592-93.
139. Ellis, supra note 110, at 31-33.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 26-33.
142. Accord R. Posner, supra note 9, § 6.12.
143. Ellis, supra note 110, at 27-28.
144. In an accompanying article to Professor Ellis', Professor Owen, fast becoming
(if not already) the American guru of punitive damages, questions Ellis' three categories.
He states:
[Ejach of Professor Ellis' categories seems to be all-inclusive or almost
so: none of the categories appears to exclude many, if any, cases. As
for the first category, the real-world probability that an actor will be
caught and held liable for any loss should always be somewhat less than
one. ...
The all inclusiveness of the second category is even simpler to see. For
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Another often cited justification for punitives applies to cases where
the defendant threatens slight harm to many. The threatened harm may
be so small in these cases that plaintiffs would not sue unless punitives
were available. Without punitives no one would sue and the defendant
would continue to engage in the socially undesirable activity because
from a general deterrence perspective the defendant would not have to
take all its costs into account. 45 Awarding punitives forces the defendant
to consider injuries to people who would normally not sue.
Others contend punitives actually serve to compensate plaintiffs for
otherwise unrecoverable damages1 " and to pay the plaintiff's attorney's
fees.' 47 These and other rationalizations for the doctrine explain or justify
punitives in narrow categories of cases or give a surreptitious purpose
for such awards, such as paying attorney's fees through the back door
when a plaintiff cannot recover those fees directly. As can be seen,
critics have not articulated a large role for punitive damages in the
efficiency-oriented regulation of accidents. They have identified certain
narrow areas where punitives may be efficient, but they have found no
such place for punitives in the larger universe of accident cases. One
recent break from tradition is Professor Dobbs' excellent article, Ending
Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies. 4
He argues that it is time to take a look at punitive damages from the
perspective of remedies. 49 Doing so, he focuses on deterrence-measured
remedies, contending that in torts committed as part of a profit-motivated
activity, extra compensatory damages should be either the defendant's
gain (or profit) or the plaintiff's litigation costs, including attorney's
fees. 150
one thing, plaintiffs in this nation are only rarely awarded their litigation
costs (including their attorneys' fees). Moreover, rarely, if ever, does a
defendant pay in damages for truly all the losses caused by his wrongful
act .... In addition, the public generally may suffer a sense of fear or
demoralization from wrongdoing that is not vindicated beyond requiring
payment for the loss. ...
Finally, the third category appears far broader, if not all-inclusive, than
Professor Ellis' description would indicate. A "thief" must almost always
perceive a greater benefit from his conduct than would the law.
Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 4, at 113 (footnotes omitted).
145. Peterson, Sarma and Shanlet, supra note 14, at 64, indicated that a ratio rule
would not be appropriate in this type of case.
146. Id. As Professor Ellis, Ellis, supra note 110, and other critics point out, this
was indeed one of the historical justifications for such awards. See, e.g., Ingram, supra
note 5, at 210; Sales and Cole, supra note 5, at 1121-23.
147. See, e.g., J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, § 2.11.
148. 40 Ala. L. Rev. 831 (1989).
149. Id. at 834.
150. Id. at 915.
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Like Dobbs, I believe increased damages may operate as efficient
deterrents. Augmented awards would more efficiently deter wherever
compensatory damages understate the societal costs of an activity.,5
Where compensatory damages are an inadequately low measure of ac-
cident costs, augmented awards could fill that gap.3 2
IV. AUGMENTED AWARDS: BEGINNING TO
IDENTIFY APPROPRIATE CASES
In appropriate cases, augmented awards may operate to encourage
efficient investment in accident avoidance by forcing a defendant to take
into account all the costs of its activities.' The basic question then
becomes in what types of cases might an augmented award encourage
efficiency? The short answer is any case or category of cases where
compensatory damages are an inadequately low proxy for the accident
costs that an activity imposes upon society. 5 4
One might fruitfully start the analysis with those rules that deny
plaintiffs the right to recovery because compensation would entail undue
administrative costs. Administrative concerns have often hidden behind
the mask of proximate cause.
151. Most commentators merely state that justification is largely inappropriate in a
world where compensatory damages are more compensatory than they used to be. See,
e.g., Ellis, supra note 110, at 27-28; Ingram, supra note 5, at 213-14 ("In most cases,
compensatory damages are quite sufficient to deter undesirable future conduct."); Sales
and Cole, supra note 5, at 1158-64. Cf. Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 4, at Ill,
113. Or they state that if compensatory damages are broken the proper treatment is to
fix them. In response to what he called the imperfect damages justification for punitive
damages, Professor Schwartz stated: "If it is true that existing damage rules fail to
comprehend significant elements of harm that torts are likely to produce, the proper
strategy entails reforming or revising damage rules directly, rather than straining for a
surrogate result through reliance on punitive damages." Schwartz, supra note 4, at 139.
The response is that there may well be case types where even fully compensatory damages
fail to force the defendant to take account of all the accident costs that its activity
imposes upon society. Moreover, there may be cases where there are sound reasons not
to adjust compensatory damage rules; that is refusing to allow certain plaintiffs to recover
may be an efficient rule, but it would still be preferable to encourage the defendant to
take account of accident costs that are not included in compensatory damages and not
otherwise factored into the defendant's pricing calculus. See supra text accompanying
notes 43-70.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-246. Recognition of this potential prompts
a reevaluation of the factors and standards that courts now employ in awarding punitive
damages.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70.




A. Augmented Awards and Proximate Cause
American law has long dispensed with the illusion that there is
anything scientific, measurable, or even causal about the doctrine of
proximate cause.'" The lesson learned from such scholars as Dean Leon
Green' 156 and Professor Wex Malone'" is that proximate cause is purely
a question of policy:'58 How far should liability go? Where should a
court and society limit a defendant's liability? 5 9 In drawing that line,
courts must consider all of the policies at stake in accident cases:
deterrence, risk spreading, compensation, fairness, and administrative
concerns. 160
Most basically, proximate cause cuts off liability.' 6 1 One rationale
for cutting off liability is the fear that full recovery by all those injured
by certain torts would deter the defendant and others like him from
engaging in socially useful conduct, that is, full recovery would
155. See, e.g., L. Green, supra note 22, chs. 1-7; Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive
It Yourself Versus American Beverage Company, 30 La. L. Rev. 363 (1970).
156. For a useful compilation of some of Green's works, see L. Green, The Litigation
Process in Tort Law: No Place to Stop in the Development of Tort Law (2d ed. 1977).
157., For a bibliography of the late Professor Malone's work, see Bibliography of the
Writings of Wex S. Malone, 48 La. L. Rev. 1069 (1988). For a personally edited collection
of some of his most influential and frequently quoted works, see W. Malone, Essays on
Torts (1986).
158. I admit that some of my colleagues laugh at me when I say this or that is a
question of policy. "That's what all tort lawyers say," one of my friends notes. Then
quite aptly she asks: "Isn't everything?" I agree, although I am still amazed at the
reverence with' which some judges continue to treat those two words "proximate cause."
See, e.g., Stoneburner v. Greyhound Corp., 232 Or. 567, 375 P.2d 812 (1962).
159. As almost always, Professor Malone's classic statement regarding the scope of
rules seems appropriate of quotation:
All rules of conduct, irrespective of whether they are the product of a
legislature or are part of the fabric of the court-made law of negligence,
exist for purposes. They are designed to protect some persons under some
circumstances against some risks. Seldom does a rule protect every victim
against every risk that may befall him, merely because it is shown that
the violation of the rule played a part in producing the injury. The task
of defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy aspects is
one that must be undertaken in each case as it arises.
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 73 (1956).
160. See, e.g., L. Green, supra note 22, at 76-77; Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19,
§ 4.
161. See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 41, at 264; D. Dobbs, supra
note 26, § 8.9; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Atroops Island, 777 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1985); Pitre
v. Opelousas General Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912
(Wyo. 1983).
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"overdeter."' ' 62 As such, proximate cause serves an efficiency-related
function. 163 One might even argue that the entire purpose of the doctrine
is to assure that people do not pay for causing accidents (or losses)
that would cost too much to prevent. In cases where courts decide
defendant's actions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries because liability would inefficiently overdeter, there would be
no reason to implement a scheme of augmented awards. In such cases
the court has decided to cut off compensatory awards because imposing
liability, even for those sums, would overdeter.'" It would not be
efficient.
In other classes of cases courts employ proximate cause1 65 to limit
a defendant's liability not because of a primary concern with overde-
terrence, but because the court is concerned that allowing recovery would
lead to an unmanageable proliferation of claims.166 That is, the courts
are concerned with their ability to deal with cases that a rule of liability
would create. The costs of administration would be too great. The
general deterrence gains from forcing a defendant to internalize actual
accident costs might be real, but when one factors in the social costs
of administration the liability rule becomes too costly. In essence, the
gains derived from encouraging defendants to institute more effective
162. See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 41, at 265; Berryhill v. Nichols,
171 Miss. 769, 158 So. 470 (1935) (best possible medical treatment would not have averted
the injury). Of course, using the Learned Hand formula, the conduct at issue would not
be negligent as, by definition, its utility outweighed its cost.
163. See, e.g., Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69 (1975).
164. Theoretically put, in terms of the Learned Hand test, the courts seem to be
concluding that the burden of prevention of the damages that are presented in the case
before the court outweigh the ex ante cost of those accidents. One of the possible reasons
why the courts might so conclude is that the cost of discovering the probability of the
injury at issue (the P in the Learned Hand formula) and the cost of determining the
severity of an accident if it does occur (the L in the Learned Hand formula) are part
of the cost of avoidance (the B in the Learned Hand formula). As such, the traditional
role that foreseeability has played in proximate cause discussions, see Overseas Tankship
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. [1961] A.C. 388, is rational in light
of the economist's concerns for efficiency as well. Relatedly, foreseeability is relevant to
the actor's ability to act in reference to knowledge. That is, it is relevant to whether he
or she is capable of being deterred.
165. Frequently, courts accomplish this result under the rubric of no duty being owed
to the plaintiff. See generally Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 42; Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). One classic, but dwindling
example, was the former rule that a defendant owed no duty to protect a plaintiff from
negligently inflicted emotional distress. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 54; see also
infra text accompanying notes 216-28.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 212-46. It cannot be denied that in many of
these cases as well there is also a judicial concern with overdeterrence. The two often
travel hand-in-hand.
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accident avoidance means are more than offset by the judicial costs of
policing the rule. Put differently, the cost of deciding the claims, even
though some or all of them are bona fide, is not worth the effort. 67
Were there some way to force the defendant to take account of un-
recoverable damages, without forcing the system to incur the costs of
deciding particular cases in the traditional manner, there would be an
efficiency gain with no accompanying administrative drain. One possible
way to provide a safety incentive without the large administrative costs
associated with case-by-case adjudication would be to permit the plain-
tiffs we allow to recover to seek an augmented award. This award would
represent the accident costs that society should "charge" the defendant
under the Hand formula but does not because of some other reason
such as administrative costs.1 61
B. The Economic Harm Rule: A No Duty Rule
As noted, judges often express their determination that the admin-
istrative costs of liability exceed deterrence gains by finding that defen-
167. The old rule against the recovery of negligently inflicted emotional distress arguably
fits within this category of cases. See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 54. There
was no question that people were suffering emotional distress from negligent conduct,
but courts classically refused recovery out of a concern for fraudulent claims, an inability
to value damages, the difficulty of defining the scope of any duty owed, and a concern
that liability would open the floodgates to litigation. See Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich.
4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970). One simple way that courts stemmed the tide while ostensibly
preserving the rule was to require some physical impact as a prerequisite to liability. The
impact allegedly eased the judiciary's burden of separating the bona fide cases from the
fraudulent claims. See id. Now, most states allow the recovery for negligently inflicted
emotional distress. W. Prosser, J. Wade and V. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 396 n.4.
Another example of a similar development in a related context was the development
of liability for intentionally caused mental distress. Initially there was no tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, although damages for emotional distress were recoverable
if some other intentional tort was established. Thus, if the defendant assaulted the plaintiff,
the plaintiff could recover for the resulting emotional distress. Absent the assault, there
would be no recovery. The other tort apparently provided the indicia of misconduct that
made the court feel that the claim was not fraudulent. Thus the court did not have to
deal with the administratively burdensome task of separating sound from unsound claims
for emotional distress. Later the law began to allow recovery where, even though there
was no other underlying tort, the actor's intentional misconduct caused such distress that
a physical injury ensued. The recovery was not based upon the intentional infliction of
mental distress, however, but rather negligence. The defendant's actions were unreasonable
in light of the foreseeable risk of physical injury and he would be liable therefore. See,
e.g., Restatement of Torts §§ 306, 312 (1965). Apparently, once again the physical harm
provided some indicia of harm that would not otherwise be present and allowed the court
to avoid the causal questions that it would otherwise have to answer-the administrative
drain. As in the area of negligent infliction of emotional distress, most courts recognize
the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
168. See supra note 164.
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dant's acts were not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 69 Another
way that the court may express this conclusion is to hold that certain
plaintiffs cannot recover or that certain damages are not recoverable.
This is in essence a "no duty" formulation.1 70 One such rule, that many
jurisdictions still follow,' 7' provides that in the absence of physical injury
or property damage a plaintiff cannot recover economic loss in tort. A
1980 shipping disaster in the Mississippi Gulf Outlet Channel provides
an apt example for discussing what Professor Laycock calls the "eco-
nomic harm rule.'1 7  A real case study may better. demonstrate how an
augmented award might have furthered deterrence goals, without im-
posing an undue administrative burden upon the courts.
1. A Case Study in Augmented Awards: M/V Testbank
a. The Facts
On July 22, 1980,'7 an inbound bulk carrier, the M/V Daniel collided
with an outbound container vessel, the M/V Testbank in the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet Channel. A cloud of hydrocarbonic acid surrounded
the two vessels and then drifted off towards Shell Beach, Louisiana. In
the collision several of the Testbank's containers were damaged and lost
overboard; they contained about twelve tons of pentachlorophenol (PCP),
which is toxic to animal and marine life in even moderate quantities.
The PCP spill was apparently the largest such spill in United States
history. As a result of the collision and spill, all residents within ten
miles were evacuated and the channel was closed to all traffic until mid-
August. State and federal authorities suspended all fishing and shell
fishing in the outlet and within a surrounding 400 mile area. Authorities
also placed an embargo on all of the area's fish and shellfish. Many
local businesses, especially in the fishing and seafood industry, suffered
financial losses. Shippers who could neither get out of nor into New
169. The erstwhile rules against recovery of intentionally or negligently inflicted emo-
tional distress are two examples.
170. See supra note 165.
171. See, e.g., State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903, 106 S. Ct. 3271 (1986). The majority and
dissenting opinions are excellent discussions of the development of the rule, the cases
which have followed it, the cases that have rejected it, and the implications of adhering
to and of rejecting it. Cf. People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100
N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985) (rejecting the rule in favor of a case-by-case approach to
the problem).
172. D. Laycock, supra note 10, at 157 (Supp. 1989).
173. This factual statement is substantially taken from Judge Wisdom's statement of
the facts of the case in his dissent from the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision of the case.
M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1036 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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Orleans were also adversely affected. Predictably, law suits followed;
injured persons filed forty-one such suits which were consolidated before
a federal district court judge in Louisiana. 174 The plaintiffs in that
consolidated suit included:
(1) commercial fishermen, crabbers, oystermen, and shrimpers
who routinely operated in and around the closed area; (2) fish-
ermen, crabbers, oystermen, and shrimpers who engaged in these
practices only for recreation; (3) operators of marinas and boat
rentals, and marine suppliers; (4) tackle and bait shops; (5)
wholesale ahd retail seafood enterprises not wholly engaged in
fishing, shrimping, crabbing, or oystering in the closed area; (6)
seafood restaurants; (7) cargo terminal operators; (8) an operator
of railroad freight cars seeking demurrage; (9) vessel operators
seeking expenses (demurrage, crew costs, tug hire) and losses of
revenues caused by the closure of the outlet."
b. The Legal Proceedings
On defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court
dismissed all claims except those of the commercial fishermen and shell
fishermen. 76 A three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed; 77 Judge
Wisdom specially concurred, arguing that, although precedent demanded
denying the claims, it was time to reexamine that precedent.' s7 The Fifth
Circuit en banc accepted Judge Wisdom's call to reexamine prior de-
cisions and affirmed their continued viability over two spirited dissents,
one by Judge Wisdom'7 9 and the other by Judge Rubin.1s0
In his majority opinion, Judge Higginbotham defended and applied
the economic harm rule to the case before him. According to his
statement of the rule, a plaintiff who suffers neither property damage
nor physical injury cannot recover in negligence.' Writing in dissent,
174. Id. at 1020.
175. Id. at 1036 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
176. The commerciaPfishing interests' claims were not dismissed because the trial court
felt that they merited special protection, analogizing them to seamen, a favorite of maritime
law. State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1173-74 (E.D. La.
1981).
177. 728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984).
178. Id. at 750 (Wisdom, J., concurring).
179. 752 F.2d at 1035 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Judges Rubin, Tate, Politz, and
Johnson joined Judge Wisdom's dissent.
180. Id. at 1053 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
181. The source of the rule, at least as to the case before the court, was the seminal
case of Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S. Ct. 134 (1927),
in which a charterer of a steamship was denied recovery for losses that it suffered as a
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Judge Wisdom argued that the economic harm rule was unfair and
contrary to modern tort principles. He- would have replaced the majority's
rule with what would in essence have been a case-by-case approach
asking whether the plaintiff suffered particular, foreseeable, economic
loss proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.182
Interestingly, Judge Higginbotham expressly noted that the claims
of the commercial fishermen were not before the court and nothing he
said would preclude another panel of the court from considering the
merits of their claims. '83 He posited that commercial fishermen might
make a "substantial argument" that they "possess a proprietary interest
in fish in waters they normally harvest.... 1,84 Apparently a proprietary
interest would supply the commercial fishermen with a meaningful claim
that they had suffered property damage and thus were outside the scope
of the economic harm rule. The distinction between the commercial
fishermen and others whom the court would not allow to recover would
be logically consistent although it might do some damage to traditional
American conceptions of property law.'85
In a concurrence, Judge Williams openly questioned whether the
commercial fishermen had a proprietary interest in the fish. But he did
not question that they should be allowed to recover. He stated: "I
would prefer that the rule be stated with enough additional breadth to
allow recovery for those who are damaged because they make their
living out of a 'resource' of the water.'1 6 Likewise, Judge Garwood
concurred. Although he generally applauded the economic harm rule,
result of a dry dock's negligence. The dry dock's negligence delayed the charterer's access
to the vessel and the charterer sued for that loss of use. In denying recovery, Justice
Holmes stated:
[N]o authority need be cited to show that, as a general rule, at least, a
tort to the person or property of one man does not make.the tort-feasor
liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract
with that other unknown to 'the doer of the wrong.
Id. at 309, 48 S. Ct. at 135. Higginbotham read this language to mean that in the absence
of a physical injury to the person or property of the plaintiff there can be no recovery.
The dissenters contended that Robins should only bar a plaintiff's recovery where the
plaintiff's only attachment to the incident out of which the damage arose was a contract
with some third party. 752 F.2d at 1037-39. If the plaintiff was foreseeable and suffered
particular economic loss proximately caused by the defendant, then the plaintiff should
at least have its day in court.
182. 752 F.2d at 1035 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1027 n.10 ("That is, today's decision does not foreclose free consideration
by a court panel of the claims of commercial fishermen.").
184. Id.
185. See generally Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
straints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49 (1979).
186. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1034 (Williams, J., concurring).
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he patted the majority on the back for leaving the claims of the com-
mercial fishermen to one side and expressed his understanding that there
would be "possible rare exceptions" to the economic harm rule." 7 Thus,
the reader is left with the impression that although the Fifth Circuit
followed the economic harm rule, it did so with a built-in exception
for the commercial fishermen.
c. Analysis in Light of the Augmented Awards Proposal
i. The Basis of the Decision
Returning to Judge Higginbotham's opinion, it is imperative for
purposes of analyzing the potential for augmented awards, to understand
the court's articulated rationale for following the economic harm rule.
Essentially, Judge Higginbotham pointed to institutional or administra-
tive concerns. The appeal of the economic harm rule is that it provides
a "bright line" rule. Such a rule is easy to apply and gives the ap-
pearance, at least, of a reasoned decision on the court's part. Moreover,
it arguably provides potential tortfeasors with some pre-event guidance
as to the kinds of harm for which they will be liable. To Judge
Higginbotham, decisions made in the absence of the "preexisting nor-
mative guidance"""8 that the economic harm rule provides are -"less
judicial and more the product of a managerial, legislative or negotiated
function."'8 9 In expressly rejecting the dissent's foreseeability limitation
on recovery, the court noted the great number of foreseeable economic
injuries that might, and did in fact, occur as a result of the disaster
in the channel.'19 The court lamented its inability to draw lines between
those who should and should not recover based upon "a determinable
rule of law."' 9 Expanding and perhaps extrapolating upon Higginboth-
187. Id. at 1035 (Garwood, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 1028.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. On the general subject of line drawing and floods of litigation, what Professor
Stone said in another context is relevant here. He wrote:
This cry has been raised against every innovation in tort litigation. It is
an insult to the whole judicial process dedicated as it is to the winnowing
of true claims from false ones. To refuse to entertain valid claims because
others might be fraudulently brought is an argument of expediency rather
than of justice.
F. Stone, Tort Doctrine § 170, at 220, in 12 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1977).
This theme is echoed in Judge Rubin's dissent where he noted that the constitutional
(and legislative) grant of authority to the federal courts to hear cases and controversies
also requires federal courts to hear cases within its jurisdiction even though a legislative
problem to the particular dispute before the court might be preferable. 752 F.2d at 1053
(Rubin, J., dissenting).
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am's argument, one might conclude it was not that people were not
injured that prevented the court from acting. Rather, it was a concern
for the court's ability to decide, in the traditional fashion, all the
potential cases that a contrary decision would engender. 192 Judge Gee
repeated these same concerns in his concurrence arguing that adjudication
is geared to decide who owned Blackacre or who ran a stop sign, it is
not tailored to decide mass tort cases. 93
Although not expressly articulated, it seems reasonable to conclude
that a correlative basis of the court's decision might be the high ad-
ministrative costs a contrary decision would have engendered. These
costs would include all the private and social litigation costs of the trials
resulting if the court had not dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims.
Writing about an analogous Ninth Circuit case,'9 Professor Rizzo has
postulated that the reason the court only allowed commercial fishermen
to recover, as opposed to "people who suffered inconvenience in not
being able to sail out in their boats,"' 95 is that "[t]he litigation costs
would be too high" 1 in the latter case.
ii. The Deterrence Implications of the Decision and the
Augmented Award
Turning again to the M/V Testbank case, the majority decision runs
the risk of forcing such defendants and others similarly situated to take
into account only potential physical injury, property damage, and ec-
onomic loss suffered by commercial fishermen and those who suffer
192. At the bottom of the court's decision is apparently a real concern for the role
of the courts in our society and their ability to keep the respect of the citizenry if they
engage in what scholars might refer to as non-judicial decision making. This concern
manifests itself in Judge Higginbotham's citation, in a footnote, of Professor Fuller's
classic article, Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudicatipn, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353
(1978). 752 F.2d at 1029 n.12.
193. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1032-33 (Gee, J., concurring). In light of the subject
of this paper he was the only judge writing to bring up the subject of punitive damages.
In the context of mass tort cases, he lamented that early plaintiffs, recovering compensatory
and punitive damages, might exhaust the defendant's coffers before later plaintiffs ever
recover compensatory damages. Id. at 1033.
194. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
195. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, I1 J. Legal Stud. 281,
299 (1982).
196. Id. at 299. The general rule that Professor Rizzo draws is that courts do not
allow economic losses to be recovered in tort where it can be expected that the plaintiff
could have reallocated the loss contractually. That is where the plaintiff could have entered
into an indemnity contract to protect its rights the court will not allow the plaintiff to
recover economic losses. In cases where there has been damage to some common property
right that no one owns in the traditional sense of the word, an indemnity contract is
impossible and the courts allow recovery "so long as the expected litigation costs are not
too high." Id. at 298.
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physical injury and property damage when deciding what cargoes to
carry, what prices to charge for carriage, 97 how to secure their dangerous
cargoes, and how much to spend on avoiding spills like the one that
occurred. Thus, even though many not protected by the economic harm
rule will be affected by an accident, it is likely that carriers will not
efficiently invest in safety. 98 One way to alleviate the problem would
be to allow the commercial fishermen (or anyone suffering personal
injury or property damage) to bring a claim for an augmented award.
The augmented award would serve as a rough approximation of the
estimated value of those claims that the court has determined are too
expensive to litigate on a case-by-case basis. In this way the tort system
would continue to serve a deterrence function in cases of this sort, but
would not incur the allegedly excessive costs inherent in the case-by-
case adjudication of compensation claims.
iii. Overdeterrence Versus Expensive Deterrence
It bears emphasizing that at the heart of the decision in MIV
Testbank may also be the concern that allowing recovery by everyone
who was injured in the slightest by the collision would lead to over-
deterrence. 99 The word-overdeterrence-must be carefully scrutinized.
If overdeterrence means that the cost of prevention is greater than the
ex ante cost of accidents, so that liability would cause an overinvestment
in safety, then a decision finding defendants liable is incorrect by def-
inition under the Learned Hand negligence formula.2 " Pursuant to that
formula, the actor must invest in safety only up to the point at which
the marginal cost of the additional investment equals the marginal ben-
efits derived therefrom. Certainly if liability for compensatory damages
would cause an inefficient over-investment in safety, an augmented award
would serve no purpose at all. Arguably, it would make matters worse.
Augmented awards would be available only where needed to force the
defendant to take into account those costs that we would want a profit-
maximizing actor to consider as costs of its activity when deciding how
much to invest in safety. 20 1 Such a case would arise where the burden
197. To the extent that regulatory bodies do not set the acceptable rate.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70.
199. For a discussion of proximate cause doctrine's classic concern with avoiding
overdeterrence, see L. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927); Prosser and Keeton,
supra note 19, § 42.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 61-70.
201. In this vein, there are several points made in Judge Higginbotham's opinion and
Judge Gee's concurrence in M/V Testbank that merit attention. Judge Gee expressly noted
that one of the problems with mass tort cases, as well apparently, although not expressly,
with all institutional defendants, is that the cumulative effect of repeated damages awards may
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of avoidance at the margin was less than the safety gained, but for
some, where other reasons, such as high administrative costs, liability
would be too expensive (inefficient). Given the incredibly high cost of
tort litigation in America, one may intuitively conclude that such cases
are not uncommon.
iv. First Party Insurance: A Lesson in Not Confusing
Compensation and Deterrence
In the same vein, a point made by Judge Higginbotham stands out.
In discussing the reasons why courts should adhere to the economic
harm rule, he stated that first party insurance is a more efficient way
to compensate those who cannot recover under the economic harm rule. 20 2
He points out that the injured parties are in a better position to insure
against potential losses they may suffer.20 This is no doubt because
victims are in a better position to value their potential losses and thus
will not overinsure. Moreover, as Judge Higginbotham noted, first party
insurance is cheaper to administer than third party insurance. 204 Accepting
the judge's statements, 205 they merely reflect a preference for first party
be irrational. 752 F.2d at 1033 (Gee, J., concurring). Apparently, irrationality contemplates
that the defendant might be forced out of -business. The most basic response is that if the
actor's business is one that is so unsafe that it cannot profitably exist and bear its accident
costs it ought to be out of business unless it provides some benefit that cannot adequately
be recaptured in its price, in which case a nonmarket response may be appropriate.'
Judge Higginbotham's points are a tad more substantial. In addition to the role of the
court, to which the text refers, he also posited that although damage awards might have some
deterrent effect, there comes a time where imposing greater accident costs can lose its meaning
as "the incentive curve flattens." M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029. While it seems arguable
at least that once the accident costs that society forces a defendant to bear exceed the costs
of prevention further liability may not have a further deterrent effect, it is not so clear to
me at which point that occurs. For instance, how do we know the point at which further
liability will not efficiently induce further care? Likewise, how can we be so sure in every
economic loss case that, if we do not take account of at least some of the losses that the
rule would not make the defendant pay, B would not be greater than P times L? Thus,
efficient behavior under the economic harm rule may actually be inefficient behavior in light
of all the costs involved. As Judge Wisdom noted in his dissent: "Absent hard data, I would
rather err on the side of receiving little additional benefit from imposing additional quanta of
liability than err by adhering to Robins' inequitable rule and bar victims' recovery on the
mistaken belief that a 'marginal incentive curve' was flat, or nearly so." M/V Testbank, 752
F.2d at 1052 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
202. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029.
203. Cf. id. at 1052 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the unsuccessful plaintiffs
are all in a better position than the defendants to insure against the losses that they suffered).
204. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029; see also Priest, supra note 35, at 1548.
205. In the interests of disclosure, I am personally drawn to Judge Wisdom's and Judge
Rubin's views of the case. Refusing to decide because it would be better if the legislature
acted seems to me to be an abdication of decision making responsibility. It is one thing if
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insurance as a compensatory mechanism in accidents of this sort. They
do not seem to have any relevance to the deterrence objectives of tort
law. Just because first party insurance is a better device for compensating
certain plaintiffs does not mean that society wants to license actors to
ignore the damages their conduct causes in deciding how much to invest
in safety. Thus, augmented awards might be an apt way to force persons
similarly situated to the defendants to take those costs into account
before acting. 206
Here, though, a potential problem arises. As noted, one of the
reasons first party insurance is cheaper, hence more efficient as a com-
pensation vehicle, is that the insured and insurer can more accurately
predict the loss in the first party context than in the third party context,
where the identity and characteristics of the ultimate beneficiary (the
tort victim) may well be unknown at the time the named insured pur-
chases the policy. If this is the case, how does the court determine the
amount of the augmented award, without incurring all the costs of
litigating the claims of all those injured persons who are not before the
court? Actually, if that calculus must take place, the augmented award
would arguably be more expensive to litigate, as the actual injured party
would not be before the court. It is argued later27 that this problem,
as well as others with the administration of augmented awards litigation,
is significant, but not unsolvable. 208
the legislature has taken a body of cases away from the courts, but it is another if the courts
take those cases away themselves. In fact, decision may be the best way to get the legislature
to act given the likelihood that defendants are better organized and more likely to petition
for redress of a decision contrary to their interests than disappointed victims.
206. The same may be said of their insurers.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 299-320.
208. The Kinsman cases provide another example of the analysis employed herein with
reference to M/V Testbank and augmented awards. In Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338
F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944, 85 S. Ct. 1026 (1965) [hereinafter Kinsman
1], the employees of the owner of a ship negligently moored it to a dock about three miles
above a draw bridge operated by the City of Buffalo. The ship was improperly attached to
an improperly anchored deadman maintained by the dock owner. During the course of the
night, ice and debris built up between the ship and the dock ultimately causing the deadman
to pull out and the ship to float down river. On its uncharted course, the ship collided with
another ship, the Tewksbury, which had been properly moored, but the force of the collision
knocked the Tewksbury loose. The two ships then commenced an unchoreographed dance
down the river. Despite efforts to get the City to raise the bridge, it negligently failed to do
so because one crew was late getting to work. The two ships crashed into the bridge; the
bridge collapsed; the ships grounded to a halt and ice began to build up behind the wreckage.
Ultimately, the river flooded and damaged adjoining property as far upstream as the place
where the first ship had originally been moored. In Kinsman I, about twenty such landowners
sued the first ship owner, the owner of the dock with the faulty deadman, and the City of
Buffalo. Various defendants claimed that they were not liable for damages to the landowners




To recap, one could resolve the problems the M/V Testbank decision
presents in regards to efficiency and deterrence by allowing the com-
mercial fishermen whose claims the court did not dismiss to file claims
for augmented awards. The claims would not be for compensation but
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision allowing the plaintiffs to recover. The court
noted that the damage was of the same type that might be expected to arise from the
defendants' negligence, albeit somewhat greater in degree, and that the plaintiffs were all
foreseeable. For years, Judge Henry Friendly's opinion for the court in Kinsman I was a
standard in certain first year torts books. See W. Prosser, J. Wade and V. Schwartz, Cases
and Materials on Torts 326 (7th ed. 1982); C. Gregory and H. Kalven, Cases and Materials
on Torts 347 (1969); J. Henderson, Jr. and R. Pearson, The Torts Process 461 (1975). In a
second suit the owners of some wheat stored in Buffalo brought suit against the same defendants
for extra transportation costs that they incurred in moving their wheat and for the price of
replacement wheat that they had to buy as a result of the accident. Petition of Kinsman
Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) [hereinafter Kinsman Il]. This time the Second
Circuit, Judge Kauffman writing, denied recovery; the damages that the wheat owners suffered
were just too remote. There is no doubt that the wheat owners suffered the damages and
there is little reason not to believe that there were others in substantially the same position
who were also injured but never brought suit. Interestingly, the court expressly refused to rely
on the Robins rule and decided the case under traditional proximate cause analysis.
For present purposes, there are two possible explanations for the Second Circuit's decision
to deny recovery. First, the court might simply have decided that, for reasons not apparent
in its opinion, allowing the plaintiff to recover damages would have been unfair somehow.
If this is the case, we can certainly not fault the court; however, if this was the basis for
decision, it was based on grounds other than efficiency for efficiency would counsel that we
desire the defendant and its insurance rate setter to take all the damages that its accidents
cause into account. Fairness per se is more of a moral factor, a distributional rather than an
efficiency consideration.
A second possible explanation of the court's decision in Kinsman 1I is that although efficiency
considerations alone might have favored the plaintiff's recovering its damages, the administrative
costs of having the plaintiff and others like it bring suit would have been so phenomenal that
they would have offset any efficiency gain arising from allowing the plaintiff to recover. These
administrative costs are not merely those involved in litigating meritorious claims, although
these alone would be exorbitant. In addition, one must calculate the costs of litigating spurious
claims, that is those brought by the overly sensitive and those brought by the less than forthright
plaintiff hoping to profit from the hardship of another. It is precisely this latter concern that
kept the doors of the courthouse locked for so many years to plaintiffs alleging that they
suffered from negligently inflicted emotional distress.
To the extent that the Kinsman II court was influenced by the administrative costs inherent
in litigating claims like the Kinsman II plaintiff's, an award of augmented damages to the
Kinsman I plaintiffs and no recovery to the Kinsman II plaintiffs would have meant a net
efficiency gain because the administrative costs of litigating claims like those at issue in Kinsman
II would have been eliminated as a cost factor. Thus, an augmented damages award to the
Kinsman I plaintiffs could have resulted in increased efficiency at less cost. Obviously, the
cost of litigating or otherwise deciding the entitlement to and the amount of the augmented
damages claim in Kinsman I would have to be taken account of, but, that cost would probably
be less than the administrative costs of all the trials that would have followed a different
result in Kinsman II and certainly would have been less with proper judicial (or some other)
supervision of the process.
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would serve a purely deterrent function. The augmented awards claims
would be designed to force the defendants to take account of injuries
that their conduct caused, but for which compensatory damages are not
recoverable under the economic harm rule. Such an augmented award
system would result in a net efficiency gain as the award would have
a positive deterrent effect without the accompanying administrative costs
of individual litigation.2°9
C. Beyond Proximate Cause and the Economic Harm Rule
Barring realistic and anticipated damages by a blanket rule against
recovery of "mere" economic loss in tort does not force damage-causing
actors to take all their activity costs into account. Augmented damages
in such cases would do so.' Of course if the rule-barring economic loss
is unjustified, as Judge Wisdom contends, courts should change it and
directly compensate the injured. To the extent that administrative costs
or other concerns justify denying direct compensation, however, aug-
mented damages can serve a positive deterrence function without im-
posing an undue administrative cost. Note that for present purposes the
undercompensatory nature2 10 of tort damages is irrelevant from a moral
perspective. It is important only to the extent that undercompensatory
damages cause underdeterrence.21 ' For instance, studies have indicated
that damage awards in cases involving very serious injuries are too low.
Likewise, in personal injury cases there may well be ripple effects beyond
the person physically injured.
1. Wrongful Death and Loss of Consortium Cases
The right of certain named beneficiaries to bring wrongful death
actions or actions for loss of consortium where the victim survives are
209. The arguments articulated herein in reference to the economic harm rule are
equally applicable in jurisdictions that do not follow the economic harm rule. See, e.g.,
People Express Airlines Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107
(1985). In such a jurisdiction, all injured plaintiffs will still not recover as some of their
claims will no doubt still be too remote in a proximate cause sense. This was the express
holding of Kinsman II. See supra note 208. Where the remoteness is based upon the
expense of litigating claims and separating real from fraudulent claims, augmented awards
may once again result in an overall efficiency gain. To the extent that decisions denying
recovery of economic losses on grounds that they are too remote are influenced by a
concern with litigation costs and fraudulent claims, augmented damages to personal injury
plaintiffs and to economic loss plaintiffs whose claims are not too remote would result
in a net efficiency gain. Plaintiffs who are currently allowed to recover would, in essence,
have a proxy for those who cannot.
210. Hicks, Statutory Caps are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal for Attorney
Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 La. L. Rev. 763 (1989); Report of the American Bar
Association's Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System 10-15 (ABA
1987).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70.
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responses to these ripple effects. They provide for damage awards to
people who are injured as a result of another's actual personal injury.
But these rights to sue are limited responses. A common limitation is
that only certain classes of persons are allowed to sue. Wrongful death
and consortium statutes may allow spouses and children to sue but not
the victim's parents, unless there is no spouse or children.' 2 Nevertheless
parents with married children and grandchildren suffer real losses 21a when
a child dies. 214 If rules limiting the class of persons who can sue for
wrongful death and loss of consortium are based on a concern for
avoiding overdeterrence they are arguably justified. 215 But if overde-
terrence is not their primary justification, then augmented awards may
serve a positive deterrent function. For example, if decision makers are
motivated to limit the class of potential plaintiffs in such cases by a
concern for the administrative expenses associated with litigating certain
relative's claims, then an augmented award which forces the defendant
to consider the costs of injuries for which it might not otherwise be
liable might improve the deterrent effect of tort law.
2. Employment and Other Relational Contracts
Similarly, extrafamilial relationships are displaced when a member
of the community is killed or injured.21 6 Friends and neighbors are hurt,
albeit in an intangible manner. Whether their interests merit protection
is one question; it is another to ask whether we want actors to at least
consider those injuries as costs when deciding how much to invest in
safety.
At the same time, employers are adversely affected when an employee
suffers an injury that prevents her return to work or that limits the
range of functions she can perform. The employer must find someone
to replace the injured worker or at least to perform the tasks she is
no longer able to undertake. Learning curves may mean that overall
production will decline. This of course depends on the nature and size
212. S. Speiser, supra note 128, at Appendix A.
213. In most cases the loss will be an emotional one; but, in many cases there may
be a loss of support and services as well.
214. Moreover, there is real concern that awards in wrongful death cases are dras-
tically undercompensatory. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 50, at 1293. But to the extent
that such awards are merely too low, the answer is to deal with this problem directly
rather than through the augmented damages vehicle.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 155-68.
216. Action for Loss of Consortium Based on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 40 A.L.R.
4th 553; Wagner, Recognizing Contract and Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants
in Wisconsin: Watts v. Watts, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 1093 (1988); Comment, Consortium
Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, 9 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 145 (1985); Woods, Loss of




of the business, but the more frequent debilitating accidents are, the
more likely they will cause losses in overall production.
These examples of injuries that accidents cause to the relatives,
friends, and employers of accident victims represent damage to what
Professor Macneil has called relational contracts,2 17 long-term complex
contractual or quasi-contractual relationships. Tort law does little to
protect these relationships. If overt protection is undesirable for some
reason, such as the administrative expense involved in direct compen-
sation, then augmented damages may force actors to consider such
costs.
211
3. Property Damage Cases
Similar issues arise in property damage cases. Generally courts meas-
ure damages in such cases by either the cost to repair, or the cost to
replace the thing damaged or destroyed whichever is less. 21 9 The re-
placement cost is usually equal to the fair market value of the damaged
thing.220 In some ways, the property damage tort plaintiff is in a position
analogous to a disappointed, non-breaching buyer who seeks specific
performance but must settle for damages because specific performance
is not an available remedy under current rules. 221 Commentators writing
about specific performance have questioned whether contract damage
awards are ever really adequate compensation, 222 postulating that, where
possible, specific performance should be the preferred remedy in contract
cases because damages do not adequately take account of all the costs
217. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Clas-
sical, Neo-Classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 854 (1978); Goetz
and Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981).
218. Many may balk at the notion of ostensibly "extending" liability in death cases
for injuries suffered by friends, neighbors, and employers. But, as noted, the sole
purpose of the augmented award would be to deter the defendant and others like him.
Not coincidentally, courts and legislatures have long used accidental death as an occasion
to serve systematic ends other than compensation. Most basically, the survival action
is not compensatory by definition. It awards damages that the decedent can no longer
be compensated; he cannot be made whole. Such awards, then, must serve some function
other than compensation-punishment, vindication, or deterrence.
219. See D. Dobbs, supra note 26, at 379; O'Brien Bros., Inc. v. The Helen B.
Moran, 160 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1947).
220. Where the property is "used" and there is no reliable market in which to
measure fair market value, the court will use the value of a "new" similar piece of
property and depreciate it. See D. Dobbs, supra note 26, at 379.
221. See, e.g., id. at 796.
222. Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle
in Breach of Contract, 94 Yale L.J. 1339 (1985); Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341




that a breach causes. 32 Professor Schwartz has argued that finding cover
often requires an investment of time and energy that damages do not
protect. He notes that the frustration and anger that the breach and
the search for cover entail are not recoverable. Similarly, in any case
where a defendant tortiously destroys the plaintiff's property, tort dam-
ages do not adequately deal with the incidental224 damages the plaintiff
will incur covering or trying to cover. Likewise, if repair is functionally
and economicilly feasible, the victim must find a repair person. The
more complex the damaged property, the more likely it is that repairing
will be time consuming, inefficient and costly. 225 Ironically, the greater
the disturbance of plaintiff's normal routine the more likely it is that
100% compensatory damages will be unavailable either because they are
"speculative" 226 or "remote. 2 2 7 An award, albeit perhaps an estimate,
of these costs as augmented damages would force actors to consider
more frequently such costs when deciding what and, how much to produce
and how much to invest in safety.12a
4. Augmented Awards as a Response to the "Does Torts Deter"
Question
Yet another reason to award augmented damages in certain, cases
is found in the ongoing debate concerning the degree to which tort law
operates as a deterrent at all. 229 Many scholars contend that actors do
not respond to the threat of damage awards. They react, if at all, to
threats to their own safety, administrative regulation, and social pres-
sure. 230 These anti-deterrence arguments seem most persuasive in reference
to the sporadic tortfeasor, the speeding driver, or the homeowner who
223. Dawsohl, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 495
(1959); "[A]n obligee has a right to specific performance, rather than a mere right to
appeal to the discretion of the court for this remedy." Comment (a) to La. Civ. Code
art. 1986 (Rev. 1984); Right of the Obligee [to Specific Performance]; 2 S. Litvinoff,
Obligations 301-02 in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1975).
224. The word is used here in the same way as in U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1989).
225. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, at 146-48.
226. Id. at 151.
227. Id. at 139.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70. Interestingly, the U.C.C. contains a
provision that, in the absence of a liquidated damages clause, awards a frustrated seller
20% of the value of the buyer's anticipated total performance or $500, whichever is
less. This is so regardless of whether seller proves any entitlement to damages or not.
It is by its nature and its placement a sort of legislative liquidated damages clause.
U.C.C. § 2-718(2)(b) (1989). It is an apparent recognition of the fact that sellers in
such positions incur expenses that because of their imprecision and difficulty of proof
would probably not be recoverable otherwise.
229. P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 221 (1989).
230. See generally S. Sugarman, Doing Away With Personal Injury Law 5-6 (1989).
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negligently fails to shovel his walk. But even some of the harshest critics
of personal injury law admit that tort judgments may serve some de-
terrent function when the defendant or potential defendant is a regular
actor in the tort arena such as the manufacturer of a potentially dan-
gerous product. 23 A large enterprise is more likely to be aware of tort
judgments and is more likely to engage in safety planning based upon
all its knowledge, including its knowledge about potential judgments. 232
If tort judgments are most likely to deter large enterprises engaged in
dangerous activities, efficiency would seem to dictate that tort law 'con-
centrate 'its deterrent effect on such actors. 233 But, it may not always
be in the interests of plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue claims against these
defendants. 23 4 These claims may take longer to litigate and require a
great investment in time and money. Consequently, the plaintiffs' law-
yer's actual hourly recovery may be less in such suits than in a traditional
garden variety tort suit.23' Augmented awards here might serve not so
much as a proxy for otherwise unrecoverable damages but as an in-
ducement to plaintiffs' attorneys to take such cases.236 In that way, the
tort system would encourage lawyers to bring cases that are likely to
have a greater deterrent effect and possibly make civil deterrence more
efficient.
5. What About Defendants Paying Too Much?
Of course defendants might object that they are paying more than
the damage they caused to the plaintiff, if in fact they are held liable,
but the same is true of punitive awards now. Defendants are also paying
more than the damages they cause in cases where the plaintiff is allowed
to recover his or her attorneys' fees under antitrust,23 7 civil rights, 238
environmental, 23 9 and other statutes, such as RICO. 2  These are areas
where some public policy dictates relaxing the American rule providing
231. Id. at 13.
232. See the discussion of the Grimshaw case, infra text accompanying notes 300-
08.
233. Seee generally Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 859 (1984).
234. Id. at 903-05.
235. Id. at 904.
236. See generally id. at 905.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
238. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 2000(e)-2000(h)-6 (1988).
239. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988). Some scholars have
contended that attorneys' fees ought to be recoverable in tort cases. O'Connell, A
Proposal to Abolish Defendants'. Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment
of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 333 (1981); Hicks, supra note 210,
at 764.
240. 15 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
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for the non-recoverability of attorneys' fees to promote private law
enforcement. Augmented awards against defendants who are likely to
be deterred by tort judgments might have a similar salutary effect on
private "regulation" of dangerous behavior. They would force the de-
fendant to take into account more of the costs its activities impose upon
society.2 4' Augmented awards would have a net positive efficiency effect
in any case in which concerns unrelated to optimal deterrence now
preclude no recovery. Perhaps the most clearly appropriate type cases
are those in which we now refuse recovery, not because no one has
been injured, but because of administrative considerations.2 42 By awarding
augmented damages to those currently allowed to sue for various types
of damages arising out of the same conduct that injures others not
allowed to sue, the law could avoid the administrative cost problems
of direct compensation while increasing efficiency. In that sense, aug-
mented damages would realistically serve to deter inefficient behavior.
6. An Efficient Windfall is Still Efficient
Stepping back for a moment, one should note a criticism about
punitive damages that might be levelled at augmented awards as well.
It is sometimes said that punitives are offensive because they constitute
a windfall to the plaintiff.2 43 Punitives are a windfall because they exceed
the plaintiff's compensatory damages. Likewise, to the extent augmented
awards exceeded compensatory damages, they would also be a windfall
to the successful plaintiff, assuming plaintiff ended up recovering all of
them.2" However, from the pure perspective of deterrence, the windfall
concept is irrelevant. 245 For an award of damages to operate as a deterrent
compensation need not be involved. This is part of the lesson learned
from the long life and continued vitality despite attack of the collateral
source rule, as well as the existence and application of restitution as
the measure of damages in certain tort suits. 246 The mere fact that an
award is not compensatory does not mean it cannot serve other ends.
That an award that efficiently deters is a "windfall" does not make it
inefficient.
V. AUGMENTED DAMAGES AND THE SUBSTANTIVE
LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Turning from the theoretical to the real world of tort suits, how
does the above articulated justification for augmented damages fit into
241. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70.
242. The economic harm rule seems to provide an apt example of such a rule. See
supra text accompanying notes 169-209.
243. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9, at 219.
244. This need nt be so. See Section VI infra.
245. See supra--text accompanying notes 67-70.
246. See upra text accompanying notes 87-91.
1
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the American tort system? That question will be addressed in the context
of the current substantive law of punitive damages. This section will
analyze the appropriateness of current punitive damages rules to aug-
mented damages awards. Despite the fact that augmented awards focus
on deterrence, not punishment, comparisons to punitive damages rules
are inevitable.
A. The Insurability of Augmented Awards
To the extent that augmented awards force defendants to take ac-
count of costs that the law, for one reason or another, has not historically
forced actors to take into account, augmented awards may lead to more
efficient deterrence through tort. Just as importantly, ias defendants and
their insurers are forced to pay247 augmented damages awards, the in-
surance rates of those potential defendants exposed to augmented damage
awards will increase. 24 Insurers who know that their insureds are exposed
to greater than compensatory damage awards will increase rates to reflect
these increased damages. Thus, the insurance premium will become a
more accurate proxy for ex ante accident costs.
But would augmented awards be insurable? There is already an
ongoing debate concerning the insurability of punitives.
Most courts that have considered the question of whether punitive
damages are insurable have decided they are, 249 but a substantial body
of authority holds they are not.250 In 1962, Judge Wisdom wrote an
opinion in a diversity case, Northwestern National Casualty Co. v.
247. Here I have assumed that insurers will in fact have to pay augmented damages
awards. This issue is discussed in further detail infra. See infra text accompanying notes
249-62.
248. This assumes that insurance rates are risk rated and that the greater the risk
that the insured presents the higher his or her rate would be. To the extent that slight
differences in risk may not currently justify the administrative expense of different
premiums'for different insureds, augmented awards may make underwriter fine tuning
more important, and easier, as the insurer's exposure may vary dramatically depending
upon whether or not the insured might be exposed to an augmented award.
249. See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 2, at 13-14. Ford Motor Co.
v. Northbrook Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1988); Daughdrill v. Ocean Drilling' &
Exploration Co., 665 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. La. 1987); Falgout v. Wilson, 531.So. 2d
492 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 532 So. 2d 154 (1988); Creech v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 516 So. 2d 1168 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Baker v. Armstrong, 744 P.2d
170 (N.M. 1987); American Home Assur. Co. v. Safway Steel Products Co., 743 S.W.2d
693 (Tex. App. 1987); United Services Automobile Association v. Webb, 235 Va. 655,
369 S.E.2d. 196 (1988). See also R. Schloerb, R. Blatt, R. Hammesfaher and L. Nugent,
supra note 110; Comment, Insurability Against Punitive Damages: A Call for Reform,
23 S. Tex. L.J. 443 (1982). Perhaps the seminal case asserting this proposition is.
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriting Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964).
250. See sources cited in Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 2, at 13 n.63.
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McNulty,25' in which the court decided it would be against the public
policies of Florida and Virginia to allow insurance against punitive
damages. Judge Wisdom reasoned that letting a defendant "pass on"
punishment to a third person would be anomalous; it would render the
punishment meaningless.2 2 The same argument applies to the deterrence
rationale of augmented awards. If punitives are meant to deter the
defendant, then the defendant should arguably have to pay them.
2 3
However, in the context of augmented awards-given the relationship
between insurance and the deterrence rationale for tort law-insuring
against augmented awards is logical.
Augmented awards are not punishment; thus, vicarious punishment
is not an issue.- As for deterrence, if insurance rates are to operate as
proxies for ex ante accident costs, then it is crucial insurers base those
rates on the actual accident costs that the defendant's actions impose
on society. To the extent that augmented awards make total damage
awards a more accurate measure of such accident costs, insurers should
include them in their premium calculus.
1. Insurability of Augmented Awards and the Breakdown of
Insurance Pools
There is yet another reason for allowing insurance against punitive
damages in the augmented award context: insurance operates most ef-
fectively when classes of insureds are similarly situated. 25 4 Insurance
works best when insureds are pooled with other persons who present
substantially similar risks both in terms of frequency and severity. The
more similar the insureds are, the more accurately the premiums charged
will represent the ex ante value of the risks that each member of the
group presents. Naturally, if rates accurately represent individual risk-
iness, it is less likely that large numbers of the insured group will opt
out of coverage based upon their belief that the premium is too high.
255
251. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
252. "Considering the theory of punitive damages as punitory . . . it appears ...
that there are ... strong public policy reasons for not allowing socially irresponsible
automobile drivers to escape .... " 307,F.2d at 441. "[Tlhe delinquent driver must
not be allowed to receive a windfall at the expense of the purchasers of insurance,
transferring his responsibility for punitive damages to the very people-the driving
public-to whom he is a menace." Id. at 442.
253. Ellis, supra note 110, at 73-75.
254. See Priest, supra note 35, at 1539.
255. Priest, supra note 35, at 1541. Of course, there will always be people who
leave insurance pools because they inaccurately believe that they are being charged too
much. That is, there will always be people who feel that they are safer than they
actually are. If identification of such people, or groups of people, were possible,
mandatory insurance coverage would be one solution. In fact, one might view financial
responsibility laws requiring automobile liability insurance, or sufficient assets to satisfy
judgments up to a certain amount as a response to this same problem.
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Professor Priest has contended that one of the primary reasons for
the alleged insurance crisis of the late '80's was the breakdown of
insurance pools. He postulated that a substantial number of insureds
withdrew from insurance pools because they believed their premiums
were too high in light of the risks they presented.25 6 Augmented awards
might prevent some of this unraveling. Augmented damages against
certain defined groups of defendants engaging in certain defined activities
might allow insurance companies to more finely tune insurance pools.
People exposed to augmented awards will be actuarily grouped with
others who are potentially subject to such augmented awards. This may
have a positive effect on the insurer's ability to deal with pool breakdown
and to charge various insureds accurate premiums. 25 7
2. Different Rules for Different People?
Alternatively, if it is true that most insurance rates are not based
upon the actual risks that the insured presents but on broader categorical
characteristics, such as age, because administrative concerns predominate
in the rate setting determination, 258 then perhaps insurance premiums
play only a small role in deterring unreasonable conduct and encouraging
efficient investments in safety. 25 9 In that case, the argument that insurance
against augmented awards is against public policy is more persuasive.
Intuitively one might opine that some types of insurance premiums play
little or no deterrent role; automobile liability insurance seems an apt
example. 260 Alternatively, one might justifiably wonder whether insureds
whose premiums are based on the actual risks they present are not in
fact influenced by the premiums they pay. 26' If certain groups or cat-
256. Id. at 1553.
257. Of course, augmented awards cannot deal with the problem of insureds deciding
to "go bare." That is, absent mandatory insurance, neither augmented damages, punitive
damages, nor simple compensatory damage awards can deal with the defendant who
decides to go without sufficient insurance and has insufficient assets to respond to
damage judgments.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100. See also Pierce, supra note 50, at
1295 and S. Sugarman, supra note 230, at 13-15.
259. See Pierce, supra note 50, at 1295-1300.
260. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 83. Although, anecdotally, many of my
students assure me that the threat of increased insurance premiums influences their
driving, I must confess it has no conscious effect on mine.
261. Without reading anything into it, the reaction of doctors and medical groups
to the alleged medical malpractice crises that we have faced in the last fifteen years
indicates that certain insureds are in fact influenced by increases in premiums. According
to popular sources, P. Huber, supra note 229, at 162, in response to higher premiums
many doctors have left particularly affected areas of practice such as obstetrics. Likewise,
in response to more and higher judgments in medical malpractice cases, doctors and
their lobbyists successfully petitioned state legislatures for medical protectionist statutes.
See generally Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, at 6-8 (Supp. 1988).
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egories of insureds' behavior is influenced by their insurance premiums,
then it would make sense from the perspective of optimal deterrence to
allow them to obtain coverage against augmented awards. 262
As an aside, if people make decisions based on clusters of factors,
including insurance premiums, tort law may actually have a greater
deterrent effect than we commonly believe. Thus, even an increased
automobile insurance premium may have a real deterrent effect and the
argument for insurability is thereby strengthened.
B. The Recoverability of Augmented Awards Under the Hornbook
Rules of Punitive Damages
Augmented damage awards have implications for many of the other
"hornbook" punitive damages rules. Specifically, as noted above, many
of the rules governing the recovery of punitive damages are tailored to
the punishment rationale and have little or no relevance to the deterrence
rationale underlying the theory of augmented awards set forth herein.
These rules have no place in cases where courts might award augmented
damages not to punish a defendant but to improve the efficient operation
of the tort system as a deterrent. Focusing on the deterrence justification
for augmented awards requires analysis of the applicability of many of
these hoary "rules" to augmented awards.
1. Defendant's Mental State
Universally, in order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant's conduct was particularly egregious-inten-
tional, 26 a willful, 2M wanton, 265 malicious, 26 6 reckless, 267 outrageous,2 68 or
at least grossly negligent. 269 Synthesizing these factors, one might con-
clude that the merely careless defendant is not subject to punitive dam-
ages, but that the defendant whose actions are "evil," or appear to the
outsider to be evil (or at least extremely stupid), will be subject to
punitive liability. This focus on the evil defendant is consistent with the
punishment rationale for punitive damages; however, it is not consistent
with the deterrence justification for augmented awards. Augmented awards
are not intended to punish but to deter, to encourage actors to consider
262. This is certainly not to suggest that such coverage should be mandatory. It
should, it seems, be a simple question of contract.
263. J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, §§ 5.01-5.04; D. Dobbs, supra note
26, § 3.9, at 205; Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, § 34, at 213-14.








all the costs of their activities. 20 They are designed to deal with cases
where current legal rules cannot be easily accommodated to directly
compensate those who are injured, most often because of the high
administrative costs associated with a "direct" fix. Moreover, to the
extent that the current standards defining one's entitlement to punitives
deter only the very stupid, they ignore the fact that.suboptimal damage
awards may underdeter both the careless and careful. 2 1 In short, in
,augmented damages cases the court should not focus on the reprehen-
sibility of the defendant's conduct, but on whether compensatory dam-
ages are too low. Are the compensatories awarded an insufficient deterrent
to the defendant and others like him so that these actors will be en-
couraged to engage in efficient activities, at efficient levels, and in an
efficiently safe manner? Courts, or whatever other decision making body
society chooses, should be more concerned with the risk of underde-
terrence than with blameworthiness in the augmented damages sphere.
The decision maker should seek to identify those areas where compen-
satory damages are undercompensatory: where all injured persons do
not sue, and where legal rules such as proximate cause and duty operate
to underdeter. As far as efficiency is concerned, the defendant's state
of mind or culpability is irrelevant.27 2
2. Augmented Awards and the Factors Governing the Proper
Amount of Punitive Damages
The factors judges and juries are instructed to analyze when deter-
mining the proper amount of punitive damages also tend to overem-
270. See supra text accompanying notes 153-246.
271. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 141-42 (arguing that deterrence does not describe
our current rules relating to punitive damages).
272. Perhaps there may be some distributional concern that might force the decision-
maker to be concerned with fault but efficiency does not demand it.
Interestingly, there was a heated discussion several years ago regarding the recovery
of punitive damages in products liability cases. Most of the debate focused on the fact
that it seemed wrong, or unfair, to punish a strictly liable, but "faultless," defendant.
Although these concerns merit attention, when the critic focuses on punishment they
lose much of their persuasive pull when deterrence is the issue. If damages awarded in
strict products liability cases are underrepresentative of the total accident costs that
manufacturers of a product impose on society, augmented awards may have a place-
not to punish but to force those manufacturers to consider the true costs of their
activities. Even those who seemed to favor the award of punitive damages in products
liability cases,-like Professor David Owen, imposed prerequisites to their recovery that
accord with a punishment rather than a deterrence rationale. For instance, he said that
punitives would be appropriate against a product manufacturer "in the cases of extreme
departure from the accepted safety norms in the particular industry," who fails to
investigate reports of defects, makes bad faith violations of safety standards and re-
gulations, avoids implementing a readily available and inexpensive solution, or having
corporate policies and procedures that fail to "institutionalize procedures for minimizing
and correcting hazards in-their products." See Owen, Products Liability Litigation,
supra note 111.
1990]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
phasize the punishment function. Among other things, courts instruct
juries to consider the proper 'amount needed to punish and deter the
defendant, 273 the relationship between punitive damages and the com-
pensatory damages awarded, 274 the character of the defendant's acts ,275
the harm with which the plaintiff was threatened,2 76 the wealth of the
defendant, 277 any other punitive damage awards or awards with which
the defendant is threatened, 278 and any criminal punishment for the same
conduct which the defendant has suffered or may suffer. 279 Some of
these factors are relevant to augmented awards, others clearly are not.
Thus, the amount needed to punish has no bearing on the proper amount
needed to deter. The amount needed to deter is precisely what the
augmented damage award would be geared to measure, although one
may reasonably wonder about a jury's ability to make that determination
on a case-by-case basis. That issue will be discussed in more detail
below.
28 0
a. The Reasonable Relationship Rule
Of the factors mentioned, the relationship between compensatory
damages and punitive damages, or augmented awards, is clearly relevant.
Augmented awards should ideally measure only the amount by which
compensatory awards are less than the actual damages that the defen-
dant's conduct imposes upon society. Concomitantly, there is no deter-
rence justification for a rule requiring augmented awards not to exceed
a certain percentage of compensatories, or, put differently, that requires
augmented awards bear a reasonable relationship to compensatories.2 8 '
The relationship between compensatories and augmented awards would
probably not be proportional across the board. What is relevant is the
relationship between compensatories and the accident costs that an ac-
tivity imposes. Augmented damages awards should equal accident cost
minus compensatories.
Courts often say punitives must bear a reasonable relationship to
the amount of compensatory damages awarded. 2 2 Although this rule of
reasonableness may give courts a rule of thumb to set aside awards




277. Id.; Ellis, supra note 110, at 61.
278. See sources cited supra note 263.
279. Id.
280. See infra text accompanying note 309.
281. Ellis, supra note 110, at 58-60; D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9, at 210-11.




they consider too high, it is theoretically suspect. The greater the di-
vergence between the compensatory damages awarded and the actual
costs the conduct imposes upon society, the greater the need for an
award greatly exceeding the compensatory damages. The reasonable re-
lationship rule frustrates the very purpose of the augmented award.
Actually the same can and has been said about punitive damages.2 3
b. The Threatened Harm
The harm with which the plaintiff was threatened is only relevant
in so far as it may reflect the actual total accident costs that flowed
or might have flowed from the defendant's behavior. To the extent that
society decides to deter conduct that may impose accident costs, the
potential costs of those accidents become relevant, and the harm with
which plaintiff was threatened is an apt consideration.
c. Defendant's Wealth
It is hornbook law that the jury or judge should consider the
defendant's wealth in deciding how much to award as punitive damages.
The justification for this criteria is that the punisher has to know how
much the punishment will hurt before it knows what is enough. The
wealthy man, it is reasoned, will be hurt less by a $1 fine than a poor
man. This is based on the diminishing value of the dollar:2 84 the more
you have, the less one dollar is worth. Considering the defendant's
wealth has simply no articulable efficiency justification. 25 Nevertheless,
distributional concerns may demand that the decision-maker consider
the wealth of the defendant. For instance, the court might decide that
an augmented award would put the defendant out of business, resulting
in too many jobs being lost. Or a court might decide such an award
would be unjust where those directly responsible are no, longer involved
in defendant's operation because the injury causing activity occurred a
long time ago. 2 6 Of course, one may justifiably wonder whether these
are decisions better left to a more democratically constituted body, such
283. Id.
284. J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, § 5.36; Ellis, supra note 110, at
61.
285. See Ellis, supra note 110, at 61.
286. The country's on-going asbestos litigation presents the liability tail problem in
dramatic form, P. Brodeur, Outrageous Conduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial (1985),
D. Hensler, W. Felstiner, M. Selvin and P. Ebener, Asbestos in the Courts: The
Challenge of Mass Toxic Torts (1985), B. Castleman, Asbestos: Medical and Legal
Aspects (1984), although there is disagreement concerning just what the manufacturers




as a legislature. A direct, collectively determined subsidy may be a better
way of addressing certain problems than allowing a court to make a
more insulated decision.
d. Other Awards or Punishment
The amount of any other punitive damages or augmented awards
the defendant has to pay is still a relevant concern in the augmented
damages context. 217 Other awards are obviously relevant to the deterrence
goal. The extent to which all damage awards adequately represent actual
accident costs is a critical inquiry. Awards totaling more than total
accident costs would tend to overdeter.
The amount of any criminal fines or punishment that authorities
may impose is susceptible to a similar analysis. If criminal sanctions
are viewed solely as punishment, then they have no bearing upon the
efficiency rationale for augmented awards. But if society decides to
employ the criminal law as an efficiency-oriented tool to foster optimal
deterrence, criminal sanctions become as relevant to the accident cost/
augmented award calculation as other punitive/augmented damages
awards. Naturally, accurate optimal deterrence will require that the
relevant decision makers accurately gauge the deterrent effect of the
criminal sanctions imposed upon the defendant regardless of their pur-
pose.
e. Recovery From an Estate
Another generally accepted "punitive damages" rule is that punitive
damages are not recoverable from an estate. The reason typically given
for this rule is that if the tortfeasor is dead it is impossible to punish
or deter him. 2s8 This justification for the general rule ignores the fact
that punitive damages may have an effect on others like the decedent.
Recent cases have recognized this fact and have held estates liable for
punitive damages. 2 9 Where appropriate to deter others, augmented awards
ought to be recoverable from an estate. To the extent that augmented
awards against estates will cause the insurance rates of those in insurance
pools with those decedents to rise, they may be efficient. This increase
would have a deterrent effect by forcing those in the pool to take
account of more of the accident costs they impose upon society. 290
287. The articulated justification for the augmented award in this piece is its ability
to force the defendant in a tort suit to more fully and accurately consider all of its
accident costs when deciding what to do and how much to invest in safety.
288. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 143, questioning this rule. J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher,
supra note 110, § 9.10.
289. See sources cited supra note 288. See also Demarest and Jones, supra note
130.




Another frequently litigated and oft-written about 29' topic is the
vicarious liability of an employer for punitive damages. There are two
generally available rules regarding when an employer is liable for punitive
damages levied as a result of an employee's conduct. One provides that
an employer is vicariously liable for punitive damages whenever it is
vicariously liable for the tort of the employee. 292 This has been called
the respondeat superior rule.293 The other rule, which both the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts294 and the Restatement of Agency 295 have adopted,
is known as the complicity rule. It provides that a principal is vicariously
liable for punitive damages only if it recklessly hired an incompetent
employee, authorized reckless behavior, ratified the conduct at issue, or
if the underlying tortious act was committed by a managerial agent. 29
The complicity rule is based on the notion that it is unfair to punish
one person for another's wrong. 297 In the corporate context the complicity
rule is grounded in the perceived inequity of punishing helpless share-
holders for a subordinate employee's wrongful act. 29 The complicity
rule loses much of its persuasive appeal, however, when the focus is
switched from punishment to deterrence and from punitives to augmented
awards. If the justification for imposing augmented awards is to force
an actor to take all its accident costs into account, then, an enterprise
ought to be liable for augmented awards wherever the act that caused
an accident is attributable to that enterprise. Thus, in an augmented
291. J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, ch. 24; L. Schlueter and K. Redden,
supra note 110, § 4.4(B)(2); D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9, at 214; Prosser and
Keeton, supra note 19, § 2, at 13.




296. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (1977).
§ 909 Punitive Damages
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of the act by an agent if, but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act,
or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing
him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting
in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.
Accord Restatement of Agency § 217 C (1957).
297. D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9.
298. Id.
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damages case respondeat superior is the only sensible rule to determine
the vicarious liability for augmented awards.
3. Summary
The focus on augmented awards as a possible tool in deterring
inefficiently unsafe conduct forces a reexamination of some of the
routinely accepted general rules associated with punitive damages. Many
of these rules are geared towards the punishment function of punitive
damages and are anomalous if the law is trying to deter, without
necessarily punishing. Instead, legal rules associated with augmented
damages should attempt to isolate the types of cases where compensatory
damages and substantive tort rules do not adequately deter. That is,
the law should attempt to identify case-types where actors are not forced
to take all their accident costs into account. This analysis should first
seek to determine if rules and damages that are now undercompensatory
can be made an adequate deterrent by being made adequately compen-
satory. If for some reason they cannot, unduly high administrative costs
for instance, augmented damages may provide a workable answer.
VI. AUGMENTED AWARDS: SOME PRACTICAL CONCERNS
Given the theoretical basis for augmented awards, some practical
impediments may surface in their implemention. Many questions arise:
Who decides whether augmented awards are appropriate in a given type
of case? What type of tribunal should impose augmented awards? Should
personal injury victims prosecute and recover augmented awards? How
much should augmented awards be? These are difficult questions that
must be addressed. Many of them are as troublesome in current punitive
damages practice as they would be in the proposed augmented damages
arena. Unfortunately, a complete response is beyond the scope of this
article.
A. The Proper Amount
The proper amount of an augmented award should be enough to
deter the defendant and others like him from acting in a socially un-
acceptable manner, but no more.2 99 Ideally it would equal the amount
by which the accident costs that an activity imposes upon society exceeds
the sum of compensatory damage awards, administrative fines, criminal
fines, and any other amount paid out as a partial proxy for accident
costs. It should be enough to cause the insurance premiums that classes
of actors pay to accurately reflect the total probability of a loss occurring
multiplied by the dollar value of the loss if it does occur.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 43-108.
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In short, augmented awards should be set to make the actor's ex
ante cost-benefit analysis of safety investments more accurate.
1. An Aside: Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 300
An illustration of this point is the celebrated California case involving
the Ford Pinto, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. In Grimshaw the jury
awarded the injured plaintiffP° $125 million in punitive damages, os-
tensibly because Ford had engaged in a cost-benefit analysis and con-
cluded that protecting the Pinto's gas tank from collision and fire would
cost more than the amount of total judgments the company would have
to pay tort claimants in "gas tank" claims. 0 2 The trial court reduced
the punitive damages award to $3.5 million, the appeals court affirmed. 30 3
Some scholars have pointed out that if Ford was liable for punitive
damages because it engaged in the type cost-benefit analysis on which
the Learned Hand definition of negligence is based, the case represents
a repudiation of the economic analysis of tort law in the extreme.3 4
Certainly there is that air about the appellate court's opinion, but
it need not be read so broadly. One can reasonably conclude that what
got Ford into trouble was not the fact that it engaged in a cost-benefit
analysis, but that it improperly engaged in that analysis. Ford's analysis
was arguably improper for two reasons. First, Ford underestimated the
damages that courts would order it to pay. That is, actual compensatory
damages, under current legal rules, would have been higher than Ford
estimated. But, even if Ford's estimate of what courts would order it
to pay was right, one could argue this figure was still incorrect because
it was still too low because the amounts that courts would award, or
that Ford would pay out in settlements, did not take into account all
the potential accident costs the Pinto would impose on society. The
purpose of a punitive damages award, then, was arguably not simply
to punish Ford for engaging in a cost-benefit analysis involving life and
limb, but to encourage Ford 05 to' conduct that cost-benefit analysis
properly in the future. This is essentially this piece's definition of the
300. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
301. Actually, in the wreck in which the plaintiff was injured, the driver was killed.
The driver's survivors also filed suit. The plaintiff was awarded $659,680 in compensatory
damages.
302. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
303. Id. at 777, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
304. D. Laycock, supra note 10, at 607.
305. One might persuasively argue that Ford also needed to be punished to satisfy
society's moral appetite for just desserts.
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augmented award, an award which should accurately measure those
additional accident costs.3 a 6
The Grimshaw appellate court's lack of meaningful analysis leaves
something to be desired.3 °7 As is, the award looks unpredictable and
unprincipled. Perhaps even as an ad hoc unprincipled imposition of a
"superdeterrent" it would be justified as a reminder to Ford to get it
right next time. Under this view, the amount is not really important as
long as it catches Ford's attention and forces Ford to modify its behavior.
But several problems arise with this justification of the role of increased
awards. First, it renders the amount, as well as the exposure to the
award, so uncertain that overdeterrence is a real fear.3 0 Moreover, the
case does not say that Ford better be sure to take account of all accident
costs next time: its message is ambiguous. Finally, one wonders why
we should delegate to Ford the responsibility for determining all of the
accident costs its products will cause society. Certainly Ford might be
in the best position to gauge how many people will be in accidents,
what their ages might be, what factors caused accidents, and what historic
judgments against Ford have been. But Ford may not be in the best
position to determine who (other than drivers and passengers of Pintos
and other cars) will be injured; what their injuries will be; what value
to place upon damaged relationships the law does not currently protect;
or what the administrative costs of varying proximate cause, duty, and
compensatory damages rules would be in certain areas.
Not only is Ford unlikely to be in the best position to make these
determinations, but judges and juries sitting in particular cases also may
not be the most desirable check on the tortfeasor's cost-benefit analysis.
B. Who Decides?
As the system currently operates, judges and juries make decisions
regarding punitive damages. Unless new processes are developed, judges
and juries also would make those decisions regarding liability for and
amount of augmented damages.
1. Case-by-Case Decisions by Judges and Juries
Of course there is some desirability in having a decentralized, case-
by-case determination of whether augmented damages are appropriate.
Case-by-case decision-making allows flexibility and precise tailoring of
306. One might also argue that punitives are appropriate because Ford insisted on
looking at what was only in terms of a present dollar value. That, however, is a moral
concern that is beyond the scope of this paper.
307. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 807-21, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 380-89.
308. Ellis, supra note 110, at 46-63; D. Dobbs, supra note 26, § 3.9, at 219-21.
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award to injury (of both the plaintiff and others). It also injects the
common sense of the community into the process. Unfortunately, the
down side may be too steep. The factors that justify the development
and application of augmented awards require an understanding of how
the entire system is functioning. Are compensatory damages in particular
cases operating to adequately assure that defendants are taking into
account all their accident costs? The answer to this question requires a
study of what legal realists might call the law in action. Juries and
judges lack both the time and ability to make such studies, given the
statistical and economic factors involved.
2. Increased Criminal or Civil Fines Rather Than Augmented
A wards
One potential solution would be to forget augmented awards and
increase the number and severity of criminal fines in tort cases. This
would of course require legislative effort. Moreover, once such statutes
were enacted one might anticipate that change would still occur slowly.
Common experience counsels that criminal fines for conduct that is also
tortious are traditionally quite small although this may now be changing.
Another alternative would be to supplement the tort process with a
detailed scheme of civil fines. This is subject, however, to some of the
same problems that would plague criminal fines.
3. Administrative Regulation and the Activity Tax
Yet another approach would be to have augmented awards admin-
istratively set and periodically reviewed. This would allow an interdis-
ciplinary team to review the current tort system, identify trouble spots,
and determine what would be needed to fix them. The augmented awards
system would then function like a tax on engaging in certain activities
which could be levied several ways. One way to levy the tax would be
to have anyone engaging in an activity file an augmented awards return
with their income tax. Under such a scenario, there is really no "award"
involved.
One could also use the current tort system as a collection system.
That is, whenever a defendant was liable for conduct subjecting it to
an augmented award, some sum in addition to the compensatory dam-
ages levied could be added to the final judgement. This additional
sum could go to the plaintiff or to the state for special purposes, or
it could be split between the two.
4. A New Role for the Judge-Not the Jury
A modified approach would be to employ the tort system, as we
now know it, only in part. Borrowing from a recent and related
1990]
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proposal by Professor Ghiardi, the judge could decide the augmented
damages question after the jury decided the liability and compensatory
damages issues.309 This proposal would have the benefit of case-by-
case determination, but the determination would be made by someone
with a more systemwide orientation to the problem, and with more
experience in the field, than a recently empaneled jury of lay persons.
Nevertheless, one might still worry about the expertise of individual
judges to handle the necessary social engineering involved.
5. Administrative Agencies and Insurers
Another way to handle the administration of an augmented awards
program would be to have an administrative agency set augmented
awards guidelines working hand-in-hand with insurers and insurance
rate commissions. Once these commissions determined that certain tort-
feasors might be subjected to augmented awards, then the "awards"
insurers would add some amount to the relevant actor's insurance rates
for accident insurance thus assuring that the actors would have to take
those costs into account. This system would have the desirable effect
of using the existing insurance market as a device to increase the
efficiency of investments in accident avoidance. Problems would arise
with those actors who decided to "go bare" and risk liability without
insurance. Mandatory insurance for certain activities might be a partial
solution.
6. Enforcement and Collection of Augmented Awards and the
Rent Seeking Plaintiff
Hand-in-hand with these concerns goes the question of who should
be charged with the enforcement and collection of augmented awards.
There are several alternatives. One option would be to appoint ad-
ministrative officers to prosecute the state's case for augmented dam-
ages as the plaintiff pursued her compensatory damages claim. This
looks and sounds a lot like a quasi-criminal proceeding. Another option
would be for the plaintiff to pursue its claim, then have the judge
impose the administratively determined augmented award. This award
could then go to the state in full, or partially to the state and partially
to the plaintiff, to encourage enforcement.
An obvious problem with private plaintiffs recovering augmented
awards is a concern with overenforcement. That is, would the waste




associated with rent seeking '° behavior by plaintiffs and their counsel
offset any gains attributable to augmented awards? Would the costs
associated with the rush to and arrival at the courthouse impose costs
on the system that would undermine the positive effects sought to be
effected by the proposal?3"' There are several responses. First, rent
seeking is already a problem in torts litigation. Would more hurt?
Second, and less evasively, one response would be to identify "owners"
of the augmented awards claims and not allow others to sue. One
such option would authorize state attorneys general to bring all such
suits on behalf of their citizens. Another option would be the au-
thorization of multi-district or nationwide class actions for augmented
awards. To date, class actions for punitive damages only have not
fared well.31 2 Or one could, as noted, contract management of the
scheme to an administrative agency. Undoubtedly, there are other
solutions; however, the rent-seeking issue is significant. And, awards
to particular plaintiffs, if they are entrusted with the role of private
attorneys general, must be great enough to encourage the filing and
prosecution of an action for augmented awards.
7. Augmented Awards and the Problem of Uncertainty
One of the benefits of having some type of administratively de-
termined augmented award system, aside from the avoidance of rent
seeking, is that it would reduce the uncertainty associated with a case-
by-case determination of the scope and amount of punitive damages.
Some say current punitive damages law and procedures are unfair
because they expose defendants to radically different levels of liability
depending on who is the judge and perhaps more importantly on who
is on the jury.3"3 As Professors Ellis and Johnson3 1 4 have pointed out,
uncertain punitive damage awards can have an undesirable chilling
effect on defendants who decide not to engage in socially desirable
behavior or who engage in the behavior less often than one would
desire. Administrative determination would lend a desirable air of
certainty to the proceeding. In fact, Professor Johnson's response to
the problem is to heighten the standard required for liability in a tort
310. Cavanaugh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?,'
61 Tul. L. Rev. 777 n.365 (1987).
311. The development of rules relating to the recovery of mental distress in tort
cases comes to mind again.
312. See J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, § 5.41.
313. Owen, Products Liability Litigation, supra note 111, at 10; Ellis, supra note
110, at 37; J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, §§ 5.38-5.39.
314. Ellis, supra note 110, at 43-53; Johnson, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm
of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1385, 1392-95 (1987).
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case with increased damages." 5 He calls his proposal one for punitive
liability. Fewer plaintiffs would recover; but they would recover more.
One problem with his proposal, however, is that it tends to abandon
the compensation function of tort law which the augmented award
proposal does not.
8. The Double Compensation Problem
Another quasi-practical issue arises in conjunction with the issue
of whether to award augmented awards. The entire reason for awarding
augmented damages is to force actors to adjust their cost calculations
to take account of accident costs beyond what they spend on safety
and compensation. Augmented awards would be inappropriate when-
ever actors have already built such costs into their pricing mechanism,
even though they may not actually pay such costs as compensatory
damages. Returning to the M/V Testbank case, for example, if seafood
processors know they will not be able to recover economic losses during
a channel shutdown perhaps they will pay less for fish during open
periods. If so, they in fact have been "compensated" for the losses
tort law denies them. In such a case, an augmented award to the
fishermen for losses suffered by processors would be inappropriate.
The same logic applies to wholesalers who pay less to processors and
on up the line. Laycock refers to this phenomenon as "channelling
liability and allocat[ing] . . . risks into a series of contracts .... "116
Whether particular markets ultimately function in this manner is an
empirical matter. Intuitively, I feel that upstream risk allocation is not
universal. Professor Rizzo has indicated that it is least likely to occur
where ownership of the thing physically, injured is in doubt.31 7 The
possibility of some efficient allocation of risk by contract merely coun-
sels that augmented awards would not be necessary in such cases. It
does not undermine their justification in other appropriate cases.
9. Reality: Obstinacy to Change
Many of the proposals discussed above share a common problem.
They require extensive change. One lesson we seem to have learned
from the tort crisis is that comprehensive change in the tort system
is unlikely given the powerful political forces battling. What is more
likely is what has occurred to date, slow interstitial change. It seems
highly unlikely that legislatures will set up administrative agencies to
oversee the entire tort process or adopt schedules of augmented awards.
315. Johnson, supra note 314, at 1395-98.
316. D. Laycock, supra note 10, at 166 (Supp. 1989).
317. Rizzo, supra note 195, at 292.
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Judges probably still will end up mediating policy disputes between
pro- and anti-reform groups in-the context of deciding concrete cases.
* Actually, herein lies one of the appeals of the augmented awards
proposal. It is a proposal courts could adopt as part of the common
law development of tort law without radically altering the nature of
tort litigation. It requires fine tuning and redeveloping a device we
already have, punitive damages, to serve one of its current alleged
justifications-deterrence. Nevertheless, I share the concerns of those
who feel the jury is not the best decision-maker in the augmented
awards context and would welcome Professor Ghiardi's proposal that
the judge, rather than the jury, decide whether to make an augmented
award and how much to award. Should the task overwhelm the judge,
she could employ Federal Rule of Evidence 706318 (and state counter-
parts) to appoint an expert to study whether compensatory damages
in that particular case are too "low."
C. Augmented Awards and the Mass Tort Case
How to handle mass tort cases is as much an issue with augmented
awards as it is with punitives. The award of punitive damages in mass
tort suits is a subject of current debate. 1 9 Concomitantly, given the
fact that mass tort cases represent an ideal opportunity for the court
to study the deterrent effect of damage awards on certain types of
conduct and the fact that the defendants in those cases are those most
likely to be deterred by tort law, mass torts hold some promise as a
testing and proving ground for augmented awards. In many ways, the
most logical way to handle the augmented awards question is to decide
it after the parties have litigated or settled compensatory damages
claims. At that point there would be a basis for determining if tort
damages are undercompensatory and whether an augmented award is
desirable. This determination could be handled judicially or adminis-
tratively. Ideally, there seems to be no reason not to use a single case
to determine the entitlement to and amount of any augmented awards
although, as noted, this notion has not succeeded to date in the punitive
damages field.320
318. Fed. R. Evid. 706 states in part:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion . .. enter an order
to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed .... The
court may appoint any expert witnesses . . . of its own selection.
319. J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, § 6.09 and sources cited therein.
320. Trent, The Use of Representative Actions to Adjudicate Policy-Holder Bad
Faith Claims: Not a Class Act, 23 Tort & Ins. L.J. 589 (1988); In re Northern Dist.
of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
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D. Summary
In short, the practical questions raised by augmented damages are
complicated and would require resolution over time as society gained
more experience with the concept. Our experience to date has been
with punitive damages, and the emphasis has been on the punitive.
Emphasizing the deterrence objectives of punitive damages may require
different procedures and reevaluation of current procedural devices in
this arena. This realization raises the question of whether recent punitive
damages reforms are consistent with the augmented awards concept.
VII. RECENT PUNITIVE DAMAGES REFORM
AND THE AUGMENTED AWARD
In part, recent punitive damages reform has suffered from the
historical drawbacks associated with punitive damages in general. Many
reforms unduly focus on the punitive aspect of punitive damages ig-
noring any potential deterrence rationale. Others are not inconsistent
with the idea of augmented damages discussed herein.
A. Caps
Several states have capped potential punitive damages judgments.32'
These caps, as noted, are either an absolute dollar amount322 or are
set in reference to the amount of compensatory damages awarded.323
The caps may well give some certainty to actors and insurers because
they cap the defendant's ultimate liability for punitives. In reference
to augmented awards, however, there is no obvious relationship between
the potentially undercompensatory nature of tort damages in certain
cases and the dollar limits set in those statutes that employ an absolute
dollar cap. An absolute limit ignores the differences among cases.
Moreover, in statutes where caps are related to the amount of com-
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); but see In re "Agent Orange"
Products Liability Litigation 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub
nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied sub nom., Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067, 104 S.
Ct. 1417 (1984); Report of the (ABA) Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability
System (Feb. 1987), American Bar Association Mid-Year Meeting, 55 U.S.L.W. 2450-
51 (Feb. 24,-1987); J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, § 21.11.
321. Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (1987); Kan. Stat. § 60-3701 (1987); Ga. Code § 51-12-
5.1 (e-g) (1987); Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9 (1987); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.007
(1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(l)(a) (1987); Fla. Stat. § 768.73(l)(a-b) (1987).
322. Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (1987); Kan. Stat. § 60-3701 (1987); Ga. Code § 51-12-
5.1 (e-g) (1987); Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9 (1987).
323. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.007 (1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-
102(l)(a) (1987); Fla. Stat. § 768.73(i)(a-b) (1987).
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pensatory damages awarded, there is no intuitive reason to believe that
current damages are undercompensatory in some consistent mathe-
matical relationship to the compensatories awarded. This is the same
point made above in reference to the reasonable relationship rule.
Interestingly, in several states that have opted for caps, the cap is
essentially a rebuttable presumption of the appropriate amount of
punitive damages.3 24 Typically in these states the plaintiff can recover
greater punitive damages than the cap, if he or she establishes that
the defendant's conduct was particularly outrageous or malicious.3 2
Thus, if the plaintiff shows that the defendant was particularly evil,
the plaintiff can recover a greater amount of punitive damages. It is
apparent that the focus is once again upon the punishment aspect of
punitive damages. If the defendant deserves greater punishment, then
the jury can dole it out. It almost goes without saying that this focus
underemphasizes, if not ignores, the deterrence rationale for an aug-
mented award because, as noted, augmented awards are not keyed to
the defendant's conduct.
B. Heightened Burdens of Proof
Some states have chosen to increase the plaintiff's burden in pu-
nitive damages cases to clear and convincing evidence.3 26 Again, this
reflects the quasi-criminal nature of the award. The augmented awards
proposal described herein is essentially ambivalent on burden of proof,
although two points merit consideration. First a higher burden of proof
might deter some rent-seeking. Second, to the extent that the burden
of proof has any impact on the number of cases plaintiffs win, and
how much defendants pay, the question becomes purely empirical.
How often must plaintiffs win and defendants pay to increase allocative
efficiency?
C. Bifurcation
Some reformers have argued that bifurcation of the liability and
punitive damages aspects of the trial might be desirable. 27 The ap-
plicability of bifurcation to augmented damages cases obviously depends
upon the procedure employed in augmented damages cases and would
seem desirable should traditional tort/civil procedures be employed.
324. See statutes cited supra note 321 for Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Alabama.
325. See statutes cited supra note 324.
326. J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, § 21.13 (listing Alaska, Florida,
Oregon, Indiana, Montana, Alabama, California, Kentucky, North Dakota, Iowa, Kan-
sas, South Dakota,, Ohio, Oklahoma, New Jersey, and Idaho).
327. J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110,' generally in ch. 12.
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The focus on the augmented damages portion of the trial would be
shifted from the fault of the defendant and the need to compensate
the plaintiff to the amount of additional deterrence needed.
D. Split Recoveries
Some states have reformed punitive damages so that the punitives
recovered are split between the plaintiff and the state. 28 These proposals
are not inconsistent with the augmented damages proposal outlined
herein. As long as the plaintiff, and her attorney, recover enough to
encourage efficient enforcement, it does not matter who recovers the
excess. Funds could be created to compensate those who do not recover
or who do not recover enough under current tort law. However, such
funds might raise constitutional issues. In Browning-Ferris Industries
of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,329 the United States Supreme
Court held that the eighth amendment was not implicated in actions
between private individuals. Potentially, awarding a portion of the
recovery to the state might trigger eighth amendment concerns as Justice
O'Connor noted in her dissent. 3 0 Query if augmented awards would
constitute punishment or a fine.
E. Summary
In short, some of the recent punitive damages reforms unduly
overemphasize the punishment aspects of the law. Others are consistent
with the augmented awards idea, depending upon the procedure chosen
to implement them.
VIII. ARE NON-COMPENSATORY DAMAGES A SERIOUS ENOUGH
PROBLEM Now TO LIMIT IMPLEMENTATION OF AUGMENTED AWARDS?
Some may wonder whether it is desirable to expand the role of
non-compensatory damages at a time when we are allegedly in a torts
crisis and many current proposals limit even compensatory damages.33'
Despite the attention that punitive damages have attracted, the collected
data on punitive damages in accident cases belies the notion that they
328. Florida-Fla. Stat. § 768.72(2) and 768.73(4) (1988) (60% to state fund); Col-
orado-Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(4) (1988) (1/3 of excess over statutory cap); Georgia-
Ga. Code § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (1987) (3/4 less a portion for costs and attorneys' fees). J.
Ghiardi and J. Kircher, supra note 110, § 21.16; Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19,
at 6-7 (Supp. 1988).
329. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
330. Id. at 2932-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
331. See generally Prosser and Keeton, supra note 19, at 6 n.2 (1988 Supp.). Kan.
Stat. § 60-3701 (Supp. 1989) ($250,000 cap on non-economic damages).
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are, in fact, an overwhelming concern. From the data presented in
some studies, one wonders why there has been such recent furor over
punitives. Studies by Landes and Posner332 and by the RAND Cor-
poration's Institute for Civil Justice333 indicate that punitive damage
awards in personal injury suits are uncommonly rare, contrary to
popular perception.
A. The RAND Study
The RAND study examined jury awards in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, and Cook County, Illinois, from 1960-84, as well as in all
California counties from 1980-84.114 The study analyzed the frequency
and amount of punitive damage in various types of cases including
business/contract, intentional tort, and personal injury. The personal
injury category included negligence and strict liability cases.3 The
authors also considered post trial adjustments of punitive awards, recent
experience with punitive awards, the types of defendants liable for
punitive awards, and the relationship of punitive awards to compen-
satory awards.336 Interestingly, between 1960 and 1984 there were only
ten punitive damage awards in personal injury trials in San Francisco
and fifty in Cook County33 7 where there were more trials.3 Likewise,
between 1960 and 1979 less than one percent of all personal injury
trials in both jurisdictions resulted in an award of punitive damages.33 9
From 1980-84 the figures increased modestly to two percent in Sari
Francisco and one percent in Cook County.3 40 Given the small per-
centage of cases involved, one wonders whether even these seemingly
insignificant increases are meaningful.
As to the size of punitive awards, the RAND study noted that the
infrequency of such awards in San Francisco made analysis difficult.3 41
From 1980-84, when six of the ten personal injury cases awarding
punitive damages were decided,3 42 the median punitive award was
$150,000,1 43 and the average punitive award was $372,000. 344 In Cook
332. Landes and Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, 10 Regulation 33 (Sep-
tember/October 1986).
333. Peterson, Sarma and Shanlet, supra note 14.
334. Id. at 4.
335. Id. at 9.
336. Id. Table 1.1, at 5.
337. Id. Table 2.2, at 10.
338. Id. Table 1.1, at 5.
339. Id. Table 2.4, at 11.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 22.
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County, the Study's authors noted an increase in the amount of pun-
itives awarded in personal injury cases.3 4' From 1980-84 the median
award was $82,000,'" up from $59,000 in the period from 1975-79
and $5,000 from 1970-74.147 The average award from 1980-84 was
$1,934,000,348 up from $109,000.149 In Cook County from 1980-84,
juries awarded $27 million in punitives, 3 0 up from $1 million in 1975-
79.331 The comparable figure for San Francisco from 1980-84 was $2
million.3 2 Although the Cook County increases are dramatic, the au-
thors note that the increase occurred in large part because of very
large awards in several cases. 53
The study not only considered jury verdicts in the two jurisdictions
but also analyzed post trial adjustments in cases where punitive damages
were awarded.3 4 In a little over half of the cases studied, defendants
paid the original award.35' In thirty-three out of the remaining thirty-
four cases, the defendant ultimately paid less than the jury awarded 5 6
either because of a post trial decision, new trial, settlement, or because
of reduction on appeal. 3" The reduced amounts involved ninety percent
of the total money (punitive) involved in all the surveyed cases.",
Defendants ended up paying fifty percent of the total punitive awards." 9
Significantly, thirty of the sixty-eight cases surveyed involved personal
injury cases. 6' The average jury award in those cases was $793,000;361
the average amount actually paid in those cases was $303,00062 or
345. Id. at 22.







353. Id. at 22 ($9.3 million in one medical malpractice case against a hospital, $13
million in another involving medical malpractice and products liability; $3.7 million in
one personal injury case and three other punitive awards over $100,000). Although the
1980-84 medians were higher "[mlost punitive awards in personal injury cases were
more modest" than those listed in the preceding parenthetical.
354. The authors sent questionnaires to all lawyers of record in cases where punitive
damages were awarded from 1979 to 1983. They received 68 usable responses (53% of
the trials). They received more usable responses from Cook County than from San
Francisco. Id. at 26-27.
355. 35 out of 68. Id. at 27.
356. Id. at 28.
357. Id. at 28. The one increase was from $7,000 to $16,000.
358. Id.






thirty-eight percent of the amount awarded.3 63 Of the three types of
cases studied (business/contract, intentional tort, and personal injury),
this represented the lowest percentage paid.3 64 Extending their study to
all California jurisdictions for the years 1980 and 1984, the authors
found only forty-eight cases where juries awarded punitive damages in
personal injury cases.3 65
In examining the relationship between compensatory damages and
punitive damages, the authors noted first that in Cook County punitive
damages to compensatory damages ratios were generally smaller than
in California. 66 This was true in personal injury cases as well as the
other types of cases.3 67  But, as the authors pointed out,
"[dlisproportionately large punitive awards rarely occurred in personal
injury cases. 3 6 In California personal injury cases, there were twenty-
one cases where the punitive/compensatory ratio exceeded 2:1, fifteen
cases where it exceeded 3:1, and fifteen cases where it exceeded 4:1.369
In Cook County, there were only thirteen personal injury cases where
the ratio exceeded 2:1, and none where the ratio exceeded 3:1 or 4:1 .370
In reference to statutes limiting punitives to some ratio of compensatory
damages, the authors noted that "[rjatio standards would have the
least impact on punitive damages in personal injury cases, perhaps
because punitive damages are less often extreme in such cases or because
the same outrage that leads jurors to award large punitive damages
might also lead them to award large compensatory damages.) 371
In conclusion, although the RAND study does not deal with the
possible-effect of punitives in most tort cases,372 and the authors do
note that the potential for an extraordinary award "adds volatility to
personal injury litigation, ' 3 73 the numbers indicate that punitives are
a less significant problem than anecdotal recitations would have us
believe. The authors themselves state in their introductory summary
of the study that: "[in sum, punitive damages were rarely awarded
363. Id.
364. Id. In business contract cases, 89% was paid, in intentional tort cases, 56%
was paid.
365. Id. See also id. Table 3.5, at 38. The average award in those cases was $600,000;
the median was $76,000. Id. Table, at 39. Revealingly, there were only 3 such awards
in rural counties. Id. Table 3.5, at 38.
366. Id. at 58-59.
367. Id. at 59.
368. Id.
369. Id. Table 5.2, at 63.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 64.
372. Id. at 12-13.
373. Id. at vi.
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in personal injury litigation and when awarded were usually small. 3 74
B. The Landes and Posner Study
While the RAND study considered jury awards, and post trial
reductions to some extent, the Landes/Posner study focused on ap-
pellate decisions.3 7 Initially, they analyzed all of the punitive damages
cases in the then most recent (mostly January, 1986) edition of each
of the West case reporters. 376 There were seventy-two such cases;
3 77
only thirteen were what the authors call accident cases.3 7s They define
accident cases as those involving negligence or strict liability 79 par-
alleling the RAND definition of personal injury cases. 8 0 The thirteen
cases represented only two percent of all the reported accident cases
in those volumes."' The authors also point out that two percent may
be an overrepresentation of punitive damage cases in the accident case
sample because such cases are more likely than ordinary accident
lawsuits to generate an appeal. 2
Turning their attention from accident cases to products liability
cases, Landes and Posner first examined federal appellate decisions in
products cases from the start of 1982 to November 1984. There were
172 appealed products liability suits. 383 Ten of these involved punitive
damages awards. 384 Six of those were reversed and another was sub-
stantially reduced. 85 Thus, only four of the 172 products cases studied
involved affirmed awards of punitive damages-less than three per-
cent. 386 Running the same study out through mid-1984, Landes and
Posner found forty-eight more appealed products cases with only one
punitive damages award affirmed on appeal-just over two percent.38 7
374. Id.
375. Id. See also Landes and Posner, supra note 332, at 34.
376. Landes and Posner, supra note 332, at 34.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 33.
380. Peterson, Sarma and Shanlet, supra note 14, at 9.
381. Landes and Posner, supra note 332, at 34.
382. Id.
383. Id. In San Francisco, there were four products liability trials that resulted in
punitive damages awards from 1960-84. There were two such cases in the same period
in Cook County. Peterson, Sarma and Shanlet, supra note 14, Table 2.5, at 13. From
1960-79, 3% of all products trials resulted in a punitive damages verdict in San Francisco.
The figure doubled to 6% for 1980-81. In Cook County, less than 1% of the products
trials between 1960-79 resulted in a punitive damages award. For 1980-84, the Cook
County figure was 1%. Id. Table 2.6, at 14.






Turning to state cases, the authors found 119 appellate products cases
in the ten most recent volumes of the West regional reporters, excluding
California and New York.3 88 The authors excluded these two states to
see if punitives were more frequently awarded in the more "liberal"
states.38 9 In the 119 "conservative states" case sample, punitives were
affirmed on appeal in less than two percent of the cases.3 90 Turning
to California and New York, Landes and Posner found twenty products
cases; in none were punitive damages even awarded.3 91 In all, the scholar
and the, scholar/jurist surveyed 359 products cases. Punitive damage
awards were affirmed in less than two percent of those cases-seven. 92
In those seven cases, the average punitive award was $500,000, "only
slightly more than the average actual damages awarded in these cases." 3 93
This data is summarized here to emphasize the point that instituting
augmented awards would not be like throwing gasoline on a raging
fire or importing rats during the plague. In short, although neither
study can nor does establish that punitive damages are not problematic
in accident cases, they do not establish that they are. Realistically, the
numbers are shockingly small. Naturally, the numbers on punitive
damages awards bear no relation to what the numbers might be under
a system instituting augmented awards not to "punish and deter," but
to deter efficiently. The numbers may rise if augmented awards were
made available and grouped with punitive damages in future studies
like the RAND and Landes/Posner reports.3 94 The point of the studies
in relation to the augmented awards proposal discussed herein is that
extra compensatory awards in accident cases do not seem to be an
incredibly serious problem. Consequently, development of such extra
compensatory awards would arguably not be an undue burden on a
category of cases presently creaking under the weight of such awards.3 9
XI. CONCLUSION
Classically courts and commentators have stated that the purpose
of punitive damages is to punish and to deter; however, the doctrinal
emphasis has been on punishment rather than deterrence. Although
several commentators have analyzed the efficiency considerations as-






394. Assuming punitive damage awards do not go down, which they might, if
augmented awards became available.
395. Realistically, greater stress on the system seems to come from the incredible
administrative costs of the tort system not from the burden of punitive damages awards.
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sociated with punitive damages, their conclusions have generally been
that punitive damages are an efficient deterrent only in a limited number
of cases where there is underenforcement because of the difficulty of
discovering the defendant's wrongful conduct, where the damages in-.
flicted upon individual plaintiffs are too small to be worth litigating,
or where the defendant receives what society regards as illicit gains
from his or her actions. The message of this article is that wherever
compensatory damages coupled with substantive tort rules inadequately
measure the total accident costs an actor imposes upon society, damages
in the form of augmented awards may operate as an efficient deterrent.
The total measure of such awards should optimally equal the amount
by which the sum of current tort recoveries, settlements, fines, and
any other costs we now make defendants pay, is less than the total
accident costs the activity imposes.
One area where augmented awards would serve to more efficiently
deter would be in cases where the law does not now award certain
types of compensatory damages or allow certain types of plaintiffs to
recover, not because real losses have not been suffered as a result of
the defendant's conduct, but rather because the gain in deterrence is
offset by the administrative burden allowing recovery would entail.
The augmented award proposal would authorize plaintiffs now allowed
to recover compensatory damages to also seek an augmented award.
The plaintiff would in essence have a proxy to sue on behalf of those
who it is too expensive to allow to sue directly. The fact that the
award would not be compensatory in any fashion is irrelevant to its
deterrence function.
Authorizing augmented awards and their insurability would also
have the beneficial effect of forcing insurance rates to more accurately
reflect all the costs of an activity. In this regard, the ex ante accident
costs actors face in the form of an insurance premium would more
realistically reflect the price they were willing to pay for engaging in
the relevant activity.
Instituting a proposal for alternative awards would require society
to make some choices regarding collective versus ad hoc decision-
making. These choices, however, are no different than the choices
society faces regarding any modification of the fault system in general.
Just how far reaching a change is desired and the costs of that change
would define its scope. Although this article has made some initial
observations concerning the possible ways of implementing an aug-
mented awards proposal, it was by no means exhaustive.
In closing, the purpose of this article has been to highlight the
fact that there may well be a place for something similar to what we
now call punitive damages in a rational scheme dealing with the efficient
reduction of total accident costs. Such a system could operate in
conjunction with our current tort system's primary remedial focus on
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compensating injured victims of accidents. Of course, emphasizing the
deterrence justification of augmented awards as the next step in the
evolution of punitive damages requires a reexamination of many of
the standard rules relating to the recovery of punitives. Many of the
rules we have applied to punitive damages unduly focus on the pun-
ishment rationale. In conclusion, reanalysis requires rethinking our
approach to accident law, but in the end the entire exercise is performed
in order to construct a better system of handling accident claims.

